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POLITICS, RELIGION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Mark W. Cordes*
INTRODUCTION
Religion and politics have long been controversial subjects in their
own right. In recent years, however, the relationship between the two,
and in particular, the role religious convictions should play in political
decisions, has generated significant debate.1 Much of this debate, spe-
cifically in the media and certain academic circles, is over the role, if
any, of religion in the politics of a secular state.2 At the same time,
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law: B.S. Portland State Univer-
sity; M.A., Fuller Theological Seminary; J.D., Willamette University; J.S.M., Stanford University.
The author would like to acknowledge and thank Kristin Drake and Jason Doran for their re-
search assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. This still emerging discussion has already generated a significant amount of commentary,
including several significant books and a number of academic articles. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI &
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CON-
VIM-IONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLrrICs: CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE
OF RELIGION ANID MORALIrY IN PUBLIC POLITICS (1991); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CON-
ViCrIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988): Douglas G. Smith, The Illiberalism of Liberalism: Re-
ligious Discourse in the Public Square, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1571 (1997); Abner S. Greene,
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L. J. 1611 (1993); Scott C. Idelman,
Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 337. Several law review symposia have also been dedicated to the issue. See Sym-
posium, The Religious Voice in the Public Square, 29 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1401 (1996); Sympo-
sium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 643
(1993).
2. For arguments that religious convictions should largely or completely be excluded from
politics, see for example, Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. L.
IsSUES 473 (1996); Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democ-
racy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992). For arguments that religious convictions may legitimately
form the basis for political decision making, see for example, Smith, supra note 1; Douglas Lay-
cock, Freedom of Speech that is both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793 (1996).
Two of the leading contributors to this discussion, Kent Greenawalt and Michael Perry, have
taken positions that would sometimes permit, yet sometimes exclude, religious convictions from
the political arena. Greenawalt has argued that religious convictions should generally not be
relied on in politics, but would permit an exception when secular reasoning fails to provide a
clear answer. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further
Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1020-36 (1990). Perry instead believes reliance on religious
convictions is appropriate, but would require that there also be a plausible secular reason to
support the position. Thus, it would be wrong to rely on religious beliefs where a supporting
secular rationale was lacking. See Perry, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 1, at 72-76.
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religious people have put forth a renewed effort towards understand-
ing and clarifying the political implications of their faith in modern
America.3
Although a variety of factors have led to the current focus on the
issues surrounding law and religion, there is little doubt that a primary
impetus was the emergence of the so-called religious right in the
1980s. The sudden appearance of the religious right, highlighted by
conservative politics, clear Biblical references, and the personalities of
Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, caught many by surprise. For many
Americans, particularly those on the left, this outspoken political en-
gagement by religious adherents violated the long-respected principle
of separation of church and state. For this segment of society, relig-
ion, though a valued part of our culture, is best kept private and, in
particular, away from politics. 4
Despite these perceptions, and contrary to some contemporary
thinking, religion and politics have an interwoven and long-standing
tradition in American history. As recently noted by historian George
Marsden, during the American colonial period it was assumed that
religion and politics were inseparable. 5 This assumption was true not
only of the early Puritan efforts to create a religiously grounded soci-
ety,6 but also of the later colonial experience, characterized by in-
creased religious diversity and tolerance. Groups such as the Quakers
and Baptists, strongly committed to the separation of church and state
and religious tolerance, nevertheless viewed religion relevant to politi-
cal reflection.7 As religious diversity increased during this formative
3. A number of recent books ave begun to explore the political implications of the Christian
faith. See, e.g., JIM WALLIS, THE SOUL OF POLITICS (1995); KATHRYN TANNER, THE POLITICS
OF GoD): CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIES AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1992); JAMES W. SKILLEN, THE SCAT-
TERED VOICE: CHRISTIANS AT ODDS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE (1990); GLENN TINDER, THE PO-
LITI(AL MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY: AN INTERPRETATION (1989); J. PHILIP WOGAMAN,
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON POLIlICS (1988); GARY SCOTr SMITH, GOD AND POLITICS (1989).
4. See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE
CASI AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECNESS 130 (1996); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 196-200; Ruti
Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 817-21
(1993); Sherry, supra note 2, at 477-95. For a general discussion and criticism of the way society
often attempts to privatize religion, including the way in which it relates to politics, see STEVEN
L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RE-
LIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
5. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 85
(1991); see also, MARK NOLL, ONE NATION UNDER GOD (1988) (numerous examples).
6. See John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to
American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L. J. 41 (1990) (discussing the Puritan effort to create a
religious society in early colonial America).
7. See, THOMAS G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPiS OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUNDS AND APPROACHES FOR THE FUTURE 146-51, 193-202 (1964) (discussing the early
Quaker and Baptist understanding of church-state relations in America).
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period, leading to greater tolerance for other sects, there was no ques-
tion that religious beliefs could continue to inform and provide the
basis for moral and concomitant political thought. 8
Our nation's history, since its independence and adoption of a con-
stitutional structure, has continued to be one of frequent interaction
of religion and politics. To be sure, the Constitution clearly rejected
any established religion similar to the European model and estab-
lished what is best understood as a secular state. However, this sepa-
ration of church and state has never been understood as prohibiting
religious convictions from entering the public square and informing
the body politic on an equal basis with other belief systems. Rather,
since this country's founding, religious convictions have frequently
played an important role in American politics. This idea was clearly
illustrated in America's most significant political/social movements,
such as abolition, temperance, and civil rights. 9 In addition, religious
groups have often had a significant impact in shaping the thought and
direction of America's political parties, particularly in the Nineteenth
8. See, e.g., MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CA-
NADA, 114-36 (1992) (discussing religion and politics at the time of the American revolution).
See generally, Part IA, infra.
9. The critical role religion played in these and other political/social movements has fre-
quently been noted by scholars. For a discussion of the role of religion in the abolition move-
ment, see DOUGLAS M. STRONG, PERFECTIONIST POLITICS: ABOLITIONISM AND THE RELIGIOUS
TENSIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1999); EDWARD MAGDOL, THE ANTISLAVERY RANK
AND FILE: A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE ABOLITIONIST CONSTIrUENCY (1986); Louis FILLER, CRU-
SADE AGAINST SLAVERY: FRIENDS, FOES, AND REFORMS, 1830-1860 (1986); LEWIS PERRY, RAD-
ICAL ABOLITIONISM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF Go) IN ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT
(1973); David F. Forte, Spiritual Equality, the Black Codes and the Americanization of the Freed-
man, 43 LoY. L. REV. 569 (1998). For a discussion of the role of religion in the civil rights
movement, see ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); SYDNEY AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1072-78 (1972); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Politics Without
Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 1143, 1166-75 (1990). For a discussion of the role of religion in the temperance movement,
see ROBERT C. FULLER, RELIGION AND WINE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WINE DRINKING IN
THE UNITED STATES 74-95 (1996); ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA 140-45 (1985); A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 215-19
(1985).
Indeed, a number of scholars have argued that both the abolition and civil rights movements,
perhaps the two most significant political/social movements in our nation's history, were
predominantly religious in nature. See, e.g., Forte, supra at 575 ("[a]ll major social betterment
movements of the nineteenth century, including radical abolitionism, arose from ... theological
doctrines"); MORRIS, supra at 84 ("[t]he black church functioned as the institutional center of
the modern civil rights movement"). Scholars have also noted the significant role religious val-
ues played in other political/social movements, including women's suffrage, see NOLL, supra note
8, at 184-85, immigration reform, see Gaffney, supra at 1175-88, and various peace movements,
see REICHLEY, supra at 250-54.
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and early Twentieth Centuries.' 0 Although less overt, religious groups
have continued to assert political influence throughout this century,
often through various types of social activism.''
Such examples can only touch the surface of the role that religion
has played in American politics. Religion's most significant impact
will always be as a source of ethical and moral norms for religious
people who find expression in their political choices. Such a state-
ment is not meant to suggest that religion is the singular or primary
political force in our nation's history, nor is it meant to suggest that
the United States is in some way a Christian nation. Our political
history reflects numerous themes apart from religious convictions, and
even some that would seek to disassociate themselves from religious
influence.
There is little doubt, however, that throughout our nation's history
religious convictions have played a direct role in the political process.
This fact should not be terribly surprising, since politics fundamentally
engages ethical and moral reflection. For the devout, such moral and
ethical norms primarily flow from religious beliefs. Certainly, not all
religious convictions should find expression in politics and few relig-
ious adherents would advocate such a position. However, to the ex-
tent that political participation necessitates some ethical/moral
reflection, resorting to religious norms in order to supply the ethical/
moral content is quite natural, and even inevitable.
Notwithstanding the historical relationship of religion and politics, a
number of leading political and legal theorists in recent years have
argued that religious values should be largely, or altogether, removed
from political decision making.' 2 This argument has typically pro-
10. See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HowE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS,
150-80 (1979) (discussing the significant influence of Evangelical thought on Whig politics);
NOEL, A HISTORY Or CHRISTIANITY, supra note 8, at 299-304 (1992) (discussing significant Prot-
estant influence in American politics between the Civil War and World War I).
1I. See Martin E. Marty, The Twentieth Century: Protestants and Others, in RELIGION AND
AMERICAN POLmTCs: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980S 322 (Mark A. Noll. ed., 1990)
(tracing the stages of religious political involvement in the Twentieth Century); FOWLER, supra
note 9 at 77-82 (discussing the political activism of liberal Protestants in the Twentieth Century);
Peggy L. Shriver, Table Manners: Sitting Around the Public Table at 86-87, in THE POWER OF
RELIGIOUS PUBLICS: STAKING CLAIMS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 85, 86-87 (William H. Swatos, Jr.
& James K. Wellman, Jr. eds., 1999) (describing the extensive political agendas of mainline de-
nominations in the 1990s, as distinctly liberal in nature).
12. See JOHN RAWLS, POLrICAL LIBERALISM 215-20 (1993); Audi, supra note 2, at 687-97;
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 196-200: Greene, supra note 1, at 1613; Sherry, supra note 2, at 477-95;
Teitel, supra note 4, at 747: Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083,
1089-97 (1990); Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954
(1992). David A.J. Richards, Review Essay, 23 GA. L. REV. 1189, 1196-2000 (1989) (reviewing
Kent Greenawalt, CONFLICTS OF LAW AN) MORALITY). See also, Greenawalt, supra note 2, at
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ceeded not on the basis of constitutional concerns per se, but in terms
of defining good citizenship in a liberal-democratic society. Although
articulating their concerns in various ways, most commentators have
argued that equal respect for the rights of others requires that their
liberty be constrained only for reasons that are understandable or ac-
cessible. 13 Since religious norms are largely "inaccessible" to those
outside the faith, they are an improper basis for political choice, at
least when individual liberty is constrained.
In making this argument, the majority of "exclusionists" concede
that there is no constitutional barrier to bringing religious arguments
into politics, thus limiting actual constitutional violations to the rela-
tively rare instance where legislation is solely motivated by religious
concerns.14 However, constitutional rhetoric is often brought into the
analysis by appealing to separation of church and state, and to princi-
ples which are arguably reflected in the Establishment Clause. This
has included arguments that the balance found in the First Amend-
ment implicitly requires a privatized faith under the Establishment
Clause as well as more general to the separation of church and state in
order to bolster the exclusionist position.1 5 Despite conceding that in
most instances bringing religious values into politics does not violate
the Constitution, arguments related to the constitutionality of such a
relationship have often been suggested.
This article will not address the more general exclusionist position
that a number of others have done quite successfully. To succinctly
summarize the critique of the exclusionist position, an increasing num-
ber of scholars have shown at least three significant problems. First is
the difficulty, if not near impossibility, of severing religious values for
1020-23 (arguing that religious values should be considered only when secular values fail to pro-
vide the answer). It should be noted that although most privatization arguments have been
made specifically against religion as such, many are not directed solely against religion but would
apply to any comprehensive belief system. Most significantly, John Rawls has argued that politi-
cal decisions be made on the basis of "public reason," which includes generally acceptable prem-
ises within society and therefore would preclude a resort to comprehensive philosophies or belief
systems not based on commonly shared societal premises. Although Rawls does not single out
religious values for exclusion, his position is generally seen as having its greatest impact on relig-
ious beliefs and his views have therefore been frequently included in the politics and religion
debate. For critiques of his position, see Pi-RRY. RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 1, at 54-61;
Smith, supra note 1, at 1575-1610.
13. See RAWLS, supra note 12, at 215-20; Audi, supra note 2, at 687-97; Sullivan, supra note 2,
at 197; Greene, supra note 1, at 1613; Solum, supra note 12, at 1092-95.
14. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 197 n. 9. But see Green, supra note 1, at 1624 (stating that to
be valid "the law's dominant express purpose must be secular, and any expressly religious pur-
pose for the law must be no more than ancillary and not itself dominant").
15. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 165-66; Greene, supra note 1, at 1614-33; Sherry, supra note
2, at 482-95; Teitel, supra note 4, at 747-48, 766-67, 817-21.
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the devout because religious identity forms one's very self.16 Second,
rather than being neutral, as it purports to be, the exclusionist position
operates from a biased starting point, resulting in an unequal respect
for, and disenfranchisement of, the religious adherent. 17 Third, and
most importantly, significant commentary has shown that religious
values are epistemologically no different than other political values,
thus negating the heart of the exclusionist position.' 8
Rather, this article will examine some of the constitutional issues
surrounding the religion-in-politics debate that have been studied to a
lesser degree. Examination of the constitutional issues serves two
purposes. First, the examination aids in clarifying what limits might
constitutionally exist, particularly with respect to the Establishment
Clause, on religious values in politics. Second, an examination of the
constitutional issues further illuminates and buttresses the rationales
which recognize the legitimacy of religious beliefs in politics. In par-
ticular, the "equal access" focus of First Amendment analysis lends
support to the legitimacy of religious values in the public square.
Briefly stated, the thesis of this article is that our constitutional
structure established a secular state that is neutral towards religion.
In this sense, religious values should be viewed on the same level as
any other value in terms of their political voice. Thus, religious norms
should have entry into politics on the same basis as any other ethical/
moral belief system, and, for that reason, religious norms may also be
used as the basis for our laws. Not only is religious influence constitu-
tionally permitted under any reasonable understanding of the Estab-
lishment Clause, but it is largely required under the First
16. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY. PoLITICS AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 181-82
(1988); Frederick M. Gedicks. Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 419. 427-39 (1990). See also, RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED
PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AME-RICA 25 (1984) ("[i]n everyday fact, peo-
ple do not and cannot bifurcate themselves so at one moment they are thinking religiously and at
another secularly, so to speak").
17. See, e.g., PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 1, at 8-16; Smith, supra note 1 at 1601-02;
Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67
TEX. L. REV. 955, 10(18-11 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DII O L. REV. 763, 789-90 (1993); Smith. supra note 1, at 1604-10; Frederick Mark Gedicks, The
Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical. 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 139 (1991); Idelman, supra
note 1, at 343-51.
Even some scholars who believe that religious convictions should be partially or completely
precluded from politics acknowledge that religious values are epistemologically no different
from other belief systems. See Audi, supra note 2, at 697-98; William P. Marshall, The Other Side
of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 843, 845-47 (1993); see also, Sullivan, supra note 2, at 200-01
(stating that the "culture of liberal democracy" might be a "belief system comparable to a relig-
ious faith in the way it structures knowledge," but arguing it is nevertheless distinct from religion
for political purposes).
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Amendment's free speech provision. As a practical matter, religion as
a source of political reflection also reflects what has been the Ameri-
can political experience from our nation's founding through current
times.
Part I of the article will examine the perceived relation of religion
and politics at the nation's founding, focusing on two issues: the role
religion played in America's political vision at the time, and the na-
ture of church-state separation anticipated by the First Amendment. 19
This part will not attempt to resolve the numerous questions revolving
around both of these issues. Rather, Part I will simply examine the
issue of religion and politics. On such a basis, this article will argue
that religion, though not the dominant vision, was certainly one of
several significant voices contributing to the political vision of our na-
tion's founding.20 More importantly, despite the near impossibility of
discerning the clear original intent of the First Amendment's religion
clauses, the historical context of the clauses and the rationales for
their adoption indicate that they were in no way intended to banish
religion from political life.
Part II will examine the Supreme Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence and the manner in which the Court speaks to the propriety
of religious beliefs informing political choice. 21 In particular, Part II
will examine the relationship of the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses in current First Amendment jurisprudence. 22 This approach
will illustrate that although Establishment Clause jurisprudence re-
mains in a state of flux, it is increasingly moving toward a neutrality
standard. However, when free speech issues are at stake, which is cer-
tainly the case with political debate and decision, there is no doubt
that the Court has firmly established a neutrality approach. A neutral
treatment fits within the Court's longstanding free speech doctrine,
and leads to the inclusion of religious speech on the same basis as any
other value. This section will conclude by showing how this approach
finds support in some of the underlying First Amendment values often
identified by the Court and commentators. 23
Finally, Part III will discuss under what circumstances, if any, relig-
iously motivated legislation violates the Establishment Clause. 24 Part
III will note that although current Establishment Clause analysis re-
19. See infra notes 26-127 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 26-68 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 128-277 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 133-223 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 224-277 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 278-338 and accompanying text.
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quires that there be some secular purpose to support legislation, the
Supreme Court has applied this test in a highly deferential manner.25
This is particularly true outside the context of coercive religious acts
in public schools, where the Court typically maintains that there need
only be a plausible secular purpose, which is nearly always found.
This article will then provide four reasons why a highly deferential
approach should continue, and advocates the abandonment of the sec-
ular purpose requirement in more conventional political settings.
Such an approach would treat religious influences as irrelevant in ana-
lyzing the validity of legislation. This position is more consistent with
the neutrality principles found in the First Amendment.
I. RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE FOUNDING
There are few areas of political and legal historical scholarship that
remain more controversial than the political basis for the American
Revolution, the founding of our country, and the subsequent constitu-
tional order that emerged. This fact becomes more than readily ap-
parent when religion's role is considered. This section will examine
religion and politics from two perspectives. First, this section will very
briefly consider the role religion played in the political foundation of
our country, focusing on the manner in which religion related to polit-
ics in the political climate leading up to the Constitution. Second, this
section will examine the resulting relationship of church and state as
put forth in the Constitution, and in particular, the First Amendment.
A. Religion's Role in America's Founding
In recent years, one of the most contested areas of political philoso-
phy and legal history concerns the ideological basis and inspiration for
our nation's founding. For a number of years, the dominant theory
was a natural rights/liberalism perspective, which anchored our found-
ing in Enlightenment rationalism. This theory particularly relied upon
the philosophy of John Locke 26 Under this philosophy, our founders
25. See infra notes 294-338 and accompanying text.
26. A number of commentators have noted that a natural rights/Lockean understanding of
our founding ideology was dominant until the 1960s. See, e.g., STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UN-
VARNISHE) DOCFRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4-6 (1990);
Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L.
RFv. 173, 175-76. Several prominent early works advocating a natural rights/Lockean ideology
are CHARLES S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1929); CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY
OF POLITICAL IDEAS (Vintage ed., 1958). See also, CLINTON ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL
THOUGIT OF iHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 68-70 (1963) (suggesting Locke was "the most pop-
ular source of Revolutionary ideas," but not the nearly exclusive source as previously thought).
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viewed the struggle with England as an assertion of natural rights
grounded in the liberalism of Lockean political theory. However, dur-
ing the last several decades, this theory has been significantly replaced
by several interrelated theories under the rubric of the "republican
synthesis."
First, there has been a strong resurgence of republicanism regarding
our nation's founding, with a growing number of scholars suggesting
that classical republican thought, rather than natural rights, formed
the principal ideological basis of our founding.27 Tracing the origins of
republicanism through Machiavelli and back to the classical philoso-
phy of Plato and Aristotle, these perspectives stress civic virtue and
community, rather than the individualism of natural rights.
28
Another recognized influence that is frequently discussed as part of
the "republican synthesis," but is also considered separately, associ-
ates the impetus of our founding with Old Whig constitutionalism.
29
From this perspective, the colonies' struggles with Great Britain are
grounded in the earlier English resistance against the Stuart
Monarchs, which culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689.
This movement, which predated the liberal thinking of natural rights,
focused its resistance on the claim that the monarchy was limited
solely by the "ancient constitution," comprised of custom and other
sources. A significant amount of recent scholarship characterizes the
American resistance as reflecting the same emphasis on the unconsti-
tutional nature of Britain's actions, 30 frequently recognizing Whig
thought as consistent with republican values. 31
Yet another theory focuses on the contribution and role of religious
thought to our founding. As noted by historian Ruth Bloch, a signifi-
For two recent defenses of Lockean natural rights as being the dominant ideological basis for our
founding, see DWORETZ, supra; MICHAEL P. ZUCKEII', THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUI1LIC:
STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1996).
27. Two leading works advancing the argument that "classical republicanism" influences the
ideological basis of our founding are J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLOREN-
TINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN RIPUBLIC 1776-1787 (2nd ed. 1998); see also, BER-
NARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26 (1967) (sug-
gesting the classics were an important source, but were more illustrative than determinative of
thought).
28. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 27, at 46-90.
29. Id. at 3-45.
30. See e.g., WOOD, supra note 27, at 10-17: BAILYN, supra note 27, at 34-35: Michael W.
McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.173,
176-77.
31. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 27, at 49 ("[t]o the radical Whigs, rooted in the Common-
wealth of the seventeenth century, the perfect government was always republican"); NOLL, supra
note 5, at 37 (Whig thought a type of republicanism).
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cant amount of scholarship in recent years has documented the perva-
sive religious symbolism of the Revolution. 32 While the notion that
religious dogma was intertwined within the movement is no longer in
doubt, significant debate remains over the precise role that religion
played in the founding of America. In particular, to what extent did
religion shape the underlying ideology of the movement, or merely
acted as a vehicle for other ideologies, or a combination of both.
Under one view, Protestant ideology was the primary shaper of the
political thought behind our founding and subsequent constitutional
order. This view has taken several forms, but most commonly focuses
on the continuity between our Puritan origins and this nation's result-
ing constitutional order. A few scholars have asserted that a "strong
continuity" 33 exists between Puritan political thought and the political
thought surrounding the critical 1776-1791 period.34 Specifically, these
scholars emphasize the similarity between covenant and compact, re-
flected in both early Puritan writings and the Constitution. A number
of other scholars have advanced what has been described as a "secu-
larized continuity," in which the ideological basis of the founding
draws from, but is a secular version of Protestant Puritan thought.35
32. See ELLIS SANDOZ, A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS: POLITICAL THEORY, RELIGION, AND THE
AME RICAN FOUNDING (1990); RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1756-1800 (1985); NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE SACRED CAUSE OF LIBERTY:
REPUBLICAN THOUGHT AND THE MILLENNIUM IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND (1977);
ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO THE
REVOLUTION 413-509 (1966); Ruth H. Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change in the American
Resolution, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980'S
44 (Mark Noll ed., 1990).
33. I borrow the terms "strong continuity" and "secular continuity" from Michael Zuckert,
supra note 26, at 118-21.
34. See ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1932);
Perry Miller, From the Covenant to the Revival, in I RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 322 (James
Ward Smith & A. Leland Jamison eds., 1961). For a recent argument that Reformed-Protestant
thinking was the primary ideological basis for the American Revolution and founding, see
BARRY A. SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994).
35. The "secularized continuity" theory can take several forms, but essentially it emphasizes
continuity between Puritan thought, either English or American, and the structure of our Consti-
tution. For example, Edmund Morgan has asserted that many of the Puritan ideas about govern-
ment find expression in our founding ideology. However, these ideas went through significant
transformation in the Eighteenth Century and took a more secular form. See Introduction, PURI-
TAN POLIICAL IEAS 1558-1794 xiii-xlvii (Edmond S. Morgan ed., 1965). Donald Lutz empha-
sizes the continuity between American compacts and covenants, early state constitutions, and
our final Federal Constitution. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONsTrIrUTION-
ALISM 67-69 (1988). More generally, Lutz also recognizes a number of other influences on the
Constitution. Id. at 11. John Witte has also recently emphasized what might be called a "secu-
larized continuity," suggesting that our Constitution traces its origins to early American Puritan
thought and political documents. See Witte, supra note 6, at 62-64. For a discussion and critique
of the "secularized continuity" theory, see ZUCKERT, supra note 26, at 118-47.
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From this perspective, Puritan political thought, in particular the idea
of covenant and separation of powers, is the genesis of political ideol-
ogy, an ideology that was later modified by other traditions.36
Both the "strong continuity" and "secularized continuity" theories
view Protestant political thinking as having a significant, even domi-
nant impact on the eventual political thought at the time of our na-
tion's founding. This vision of Protestant theology as the cornerstone
of our founding has been subject to substantial challenge, with several
concerns being raised. The first concern is the clear existence of other
forces, most notably the Lockean, Whig, and republican ideologies
mentioned above, which undercut the view that Puritan thought was
dominant. Second, Protestant theory must contend with the com-
monly acknowledged Deist philosophy that was followed by many of
the founding fathers. Although this is not necessarily inconsistent
with the "secularized continuity" theory, as a practical matter, it is
difficult to conceive a dominant Protestant or Puritan vision for
America's founding when so few of the founders adhered to such
beliefs. 37
For these reasons, most scholars have rejected Protestant political
thought as the primary impetus for the Revolution and founding and
have typically adopted one of the above mentioned theories. How-
ever, in doing so, most recent approaches have recognized religion as,
if not dominant, at least providing some contribution to the develop-
ing ideology. Some scholars have viewed religion as being one of sev-
eral equal contributions to American political thought. For example,
Donald Lutz's recent review of the ideological basis of our founding
states that "the American constitutional tradition derives ... much of
its form and content from" the early Protestant sects, which were
"modified" and "enriched" by the other traditions. 38
Others view Protestant political thought as subservient to one of the
other theories, but nevertheless making an important contribution.
For example, Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Origins of the Ameri-
36. See LUTZ, supra note 35, at 23-49 (discussing the similarities between early compacts and
later constitutional development).
37. See THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE 21-22 (1988) (rejecting the
argument advanced by some that founding fathers such as "Franklin, Madison, Jefferson, Wilson
and Hamilton" were primarily influenced by Christian tradition); John M. Murrin, Religion and
Politics in America from the First Settlements to the Civil War, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980's 19, 29-33 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990) (dis-
cussing how most founding fathers claimed to be Christian in some way, but very few held tradi-
tional or orthodox Christian beliefs).
38. See LUTZ, supra note 35, at 7.
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can Revolution, recognizes "the political and social theories of New
England Puritanism, and particularly.., the ideas associated with cov-
enant theology" as one source of ideas influencing the Revolutionary
Generation. 39 Although Bailyn is certainly secular in his own under-
standing of our founding, he nevertheless recognizes Puritan thought
as "a major source of ideas and attitudes" that emerged from the po-
litical literature of the time.40
Others also note the significant, if secondary, role played by religion
in our founding ideology. Thomas Pangle rejects what he character-
izes as a frequently offered thesis that the founding ideology was a
continuation of Calvinistic political thought. 4' Nevertheless, he con-
cedes the "powerful grip" Calvinism had on the American populace,
and argues that the better perspective was to recognize "in the new
republic[,] a dialogue, or even a somewhat hidden debate, between a
more rationalist and freethinking minority and a more pious major-
ity."'42 More recently, Michael Zuckert, though asserting the domi-
nance of Lockean natural rights theory, maintains that the best
understanding of the founding ideology acknowledges that it was an
amalgamation that included Protestant theology as one of several sig-
nificant contributing factors.43
Thus, even among those who do not recognize Protestant theology
as the dominant ideological basis for our founding, there remains a
widespread recognition that it was one of several contributing ideolo-
gies. On a more instrumental level, it is clear that religion, and specif-
ically Protestant thought, became deeply interconnected with the
movement to advance the Revolution and its underlying political the-
ories. A large and growing body of scholarship has documented the
central role that religion played in pushing for revolution, while acting
as an intermediary between other ideologies and the more general
populace. 44 In the words of Ruth Bloch, this resulted in "an interpene-
39. See BAILYN, supra note 27, at 32-33.
40. Id.
41. See PANGLE, supra note 37, at 21-22.
42. Id.
43. See ZUCKERT, supra note 26, at 25.
44. Major scholarly treatments of the role of religion in the Revolution include, PATRICIA U.
BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL
AMERICA (1986); BLOCH, VISIONARY REI'UBLC, supra note 32, at 22-93; HATCH, supra note 32;
HEIMERT, supra note 32, at 413-509; SANDOZ, supra note 32; SHAIN, supra note 34. A number of
other works, not entirely focused on the role of religion during this country's founding, have
nevertheless discussed its significant impact. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 27, at 114-18; LuTz,
supra note 35, at 140-42; BAILYN, supra note 27, at 32; NOLL, ONE NATION, supra note 5, at 43-
51: DWORETZ, supra note 26 at 134-83; ROSSITER, supra note 26, at 7-13.
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tration of religious and secular themes" 45 that was the basis for much
of the emerging political ideology.
The instrumental role that religion played in our founding can be
observed in several ways. First, it is well documented that the clergy,
particularly in New England, but also in the middle and southern colo-
nies, played a pervasive and sometimes critical role in advocating re-
sistance and revolution. 46 Sermons remained a central part of colonial
life and their focus was increasingly political in the years leading up to
the founding. 47 This was true not only of the growing body of liberal/
rationalist clergy emerging in New England, but also of clergy adher-
ing to traditional Calvinist thought. Scholars such as Bernard
Bailyn, 48 Patricia Bonomi,49 and Donald Lutz50 have noted the promi-
nent role of the reprinted "political sermon" on the political atmos-
phere leading up to the founding. According to one account,
reprinted sermons constituted eighty percent of the political literature
during the 1770s. 51
These sermons not only provided Biblical support for resistance, 52
but to a large degree served as a vehicle for carrying other political
ideas to a Protestant population. For example, recent studies have
shown the significant extent to which the New England clergy popu-
larized the thinking of John Locke.53 Some scholars believe that the
popularization of natural rights theories by clergy was at the expense
As of 1990, historian Ruth Bloch characterized the recognition of religion in the ideology of
the Revolution as follows:
Most historians now acknowledge the interpenetration of religious and secular themes
in the ideology of the Revolution. So much scholarship of the last twenty years has
documented the religious symbolism of the Revolutionary movement that the debate
over the importance of religion is less over the existence and pervasiveness of this lan-
guage than over its intellectual and social role.
Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change, supra note 32, at 45.
45. Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change, supra note 32, at 45.
46. See, e.g., BONOMI, supra note 44, at 199-216; BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC, supra note 32,
at 53; HEIMERT, supra note 32, at 413-509; RossITER, supra note 26, at 7-13; LUTZ, supra note 35,
at 140-42; DWORETZ, supra note 26, at 182-83.
47. HEIMERT, supra note 32, at 413-509; ROSSITER, supra note 26, at 13.
48. See BAILYN, supra note 27, at 5-9.
49. See BONOMI, supra note 44, at 199-216.
50. See LUTZ, supra note 35, at 140-42.
51. Id.
52. Id (noting the frequency of Biblical citations in printed political sermons).
53. See DWORETZ, supra note 26. Dworetz surveyed a number of sermons by New England
clergy in the years immediately proceeding the Revolution. On that basis he noted the signifi-
cant role played by the clergy in advancing Lockean ideas, stating that "the ministers conveyed
the Lockean message, regularly and with great moral authority, to their congregations, by whom
they were taken very seriously indeed." Id. at 32. He later states that "by the time of the Stamp
Act, every churchgoing New Englander took for granted ... the political theory that would ...
be used to justify the Revolution itself .... Id. at 182.
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of Puritan and Calvinistic thought, suggesting that Enlightenment phi-
losophy replaced Calvinist theology as the primary focus of clergy.5 4
Although this trend was probably true with some clergy, other histori-
ans have noted that political sermons continued to emphasize the
traditional themes of God's covenant with his people, God's judg-
ment, and the authority of scripture, as central elements of preaching.
Clergy frequently brought these religious theories to bear in resistance
to Great Britain.55 Thus, while serving as a vehicle for Enlightenment
political philosophy, political sermons often integrated broader Cal-
vinist themes into America's early political struggle.
Whereas substantial evidence exists that clergy promoted revolu-
tionary fervor, often incorporating and promoting Lockean and re-
publican ideology in the process, the various political theories at times
also appealed to and built upon religious values. To an extent this
occurrence was pragmatic, since the religious ideology of the popula-
tion was still largely Calvinistic. For example, Thomas Pangle, though
rejecting the idea that the founders were primarily influenced by
Christian traditions and theology, nevertheless states that it is "indis-
putable" that leaders such as Franklin, Madison, Jefferson, Wilson,
and Hamilton were not only influenced in important respects by
Christianity, but "were compelled to speak and accommodate them-
selves to a Christian citizenry. '56
Similarly, the general population's acceptance of various political
ideologies was often based on their compatibility with religion. Al-
though disagreement exists as to how Locke's Puritan beliefs affected
his political thought, 57 it is clear that American advocates of Lockean
54. See, e.g., PANGLE, supra note 27, at 22-24.
55. See, e.g., NOLL, ONE NATION, supra note 5, at 41-44; Bloch, Religion and Ideological
Change, supra note 32, at 45-51; HATCH, supra note 32, at 55-71. The continuing centrality of
Calvinist theology and scriptural authority is also supported by Donald Lutz's survey of political
literature of the era, which showed, among other things, a heavy reliance on scriptural citations
in clergy political sermons. See Luiz supra note 35, at 140. Further support is also found in
Steven Dworetz's recent in-depth study of Lockean thought during the Revolutionary era, in-
cluding the significant role the clergy played in its advancement. According to Dworetz, the
clergy incorporated and advanced Lockean political themes in large part because of "shared
,religious preoccupations' and 'theological commitments,' from which Locke and the minister
derived essentially similar ideas about civil government .... " DWORETZ, supra note 26, at 135-
36. This "common theistic ground" included belief in both natural and revealed law, with
Dworetz emphasizing the clergy's heavy reliance on scripture in developing their political
thought. Id. at 138-48.
56. See PANGLE, supra note 27, at 21. See also, BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC, supra note 32,
at 53 ("[oln the level of popular culture, especially, religion deeply informed political ideology").
57. Recently two proponents of a dominant Lockean influence in the ideology leading to our
founding have disagreed regarding the extent to which Locke himself was influenced by theistic
norms in the development of his political thought. Steven Dworetz argues at some length that
Locke's thought was grounded in Christian theism, blending both natural law and Biblical reve-
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natural rights frequently resorted to religious grounds as a reason for
accepting the theory. 58 One of several grounds for Whig Constitution-
alism was divine law, 59 in which the rights being violated were seen as
being instituted by God. Certainly, the republican emphasis on the
virtuous community was acceptable to some due to their Christian be-
liefs.60 Gordon Wood, widely recognized as one of the fathers of the
"republican synthesis," summarizes the manner in which religious val-
ues blended with, and supported political thought in the formative
era:
The traditional covenant theology of Puritanism combined with the
political science of the eighteenth century into an imperatively per-
suasive argument for revolution. Liberal rationalist sensibility
blended with Calvinist Christian love to create an essentially com-
mon emphasis on the usefulness and goodness of devotion to the
general welfare of the community. Religion and republicanism
would work hand in hand to create frugality, honesty, self-denial,
and benevolence among the people.61
The extent that Biblical values permeated the discourse during this
time is also reflected in the frequent Biblical references found within
the political literature of the era. This is clearly demonstrated in a
study by Donald Lutz. Professor Lutz surveyed political literature be-
tween 1760 and 1805, examining the frequency of citations to the fol-
lowing sources: Bible, Enlightenment, Whig, Common Law, Classical,
and other.62 Although his sample included only approximately one-
tenth of the sermons in print, it did include about one-third of all sig-
nificant secular publications. The Lutz study found the Bible to be the
most frequently cited document. 63 Even without the sermons, Biblical
references constituted about nine percent of the citations in the secu-
lation. See DWORETZ, supra note 26, at 116-34. Michael Zuckert rejects this view, stating that
Locke's political theory derived largely from a rationalist perspective. See ZUCKE~r, supra note
26, at 154-59. On a more general level, however, commentators have noted that Locke's ideas
about the social contract have their origins in Puritan views on the covenanted church. See, e.g.,
Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change, supra note 32, at 47.
58. See DWORETZ, supra note 26, at 135-48.
59. See McConnell, supra note 26, at 192 (stating that in Whig Constitutionalism, "rights are
derived from a source that precedes positive law-whether from custom, nature, or from God").
60. See WOOD, supra note 27, at 117-18 (discussing the influence of religion on political
thought prior to the revolution); NOLL, ONE NATrION supra note 5, at 41-43 (discussing the nu-
merous similarities between the republican and Christian values and the support Christianity
gave to the acceptance of republicanism); HArCH, supra note 32, at 66-68 (discussing the clergy's
support of republican virtues).
61. See WOOD, supra note 27, at 118.
62. See LUTZ, supra note 35, at 140-47.
63. See id., at 140.
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lar works, approximating the same number of citations to classical
references. 64
The frequent synthesis and combination of religious and secular
thought might frustrate those seeking to neatly categorize the devel-
opment of political thought at the founding. However, this blending
of thoughts and ideas did not pose a significant intellectual hurdle to
most minds at the time.65 Although this description did not define
each individual experience, to many people religion was a natural part
of the public order, interwoven with political notions. Certainly, "re-
ligion len[t] its vocabulary" to the revolutionary movement. Moreo-
ver, as noted by Bloch, the ideology of our founding developed
"within a structure largely defined by the Calvinist experiential ap-
proach to salvation and providential understanding of the collective
experience of God's people on earth. '66 Within this context there was
a frequent overlap of language and ideas, as many Americans viewed
the struggle in both religious and secular terms. Professor Bloch fur-
ther states that "[b]y the mid-1770's,... religion was so deeply inter-
twined with the Revolutionary political ideology that it seems virtually
impossible to distinguish [between] them. '67
In sum, there is substantial evidence that religion and politics were
closely intertwined at our nation's founding. Although some scholars
view religion as providing the dominant ideological basis for our
founding, it is more likely that religion was one of several contributing
ideological bases, although probably not a dominant factor. However,
an important interplay between religion and politics was taken for
granted, with religion providing the population with much of the moti-
vation for revolution. Religion also served as a conduit for political
thought and provided a substantive foundation upon which to build a
nation.
More importantly, there is no evidence that religion was discon-
nected from politics or relegated to a private role at our founding. To
the contrary, religion was closely related to politics on various levels,
64. See id.
65. See McConnell, supra note 26, at 192-95 (arguing that a combination of nature, divine law,
custom, and common law all contributed to the pre-Revolutionary ideology of the colonists).
66. See Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change, supra note 32, at 47. Patricia Bonomi makes
a similar point, stating "[t]he sights and sounds of today's cities are not primarily symbolic of
religion. But in eighteenth-century America-in city, village, and countryside-the idiom of
religion penetrated all discourse, underlay all thought, marked all observances, gave meaning to
every public and private crisis." BONOMI, supra note 44, at 3. See also, Steven D. Smith, The
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 157
(1991) (asserting that "the founding generation was deeply and pervasively influenced by Protes-
tant thought and practice").
67. See Bloch, Religion and Ideological Change, supra note 32, at 50.
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providing ideological support, lending its vocabulary, and providing a
central motivational force. Not only did religion support and blend
with political thought, it was political thought. It is abundantly clear
that religion had a significant political dimension during this time.
Religion's effect on politics was broadly accepted by the populace,
recognized by our country's leaders, and played a central role in es-
tablishing our nation.68
B. The Constitutional Separation of Church and State
It is clear that the Federal Constitution created a secular govern-
ment. Some commentators have gone so far as to label it a "Godless
Constitution," including both those who applaud,69 as well as those
who lament such a result. 70 In one sense, this is an accurate descrip-
tion, since the Constitution makes no mention of God, specifically
precludes the use of religious oaths of office, and prohibits "laws re-
specting an establishment of religion."'7' The secular form is more ap-
parent when viewed in contrast to early documents and state
constitutions, which almost inevitably included references to God.
2
68. Upon a thorough examination of the role of religion in the Revolution and Founding,
historian Patricia Bonomi provides this summary:
Religious doctrine and rhetoric, then, contributed in a fundamental way to the coming
of the American Revolution and to its final success. In an age of political moderation,
when many colonials hesitated at the brink of civil war, patriotic clergymen told their
congregations that failure to oppose British tyranny would be an offense in the sight of
Heaven. Where political theory advised caution, religious doctrine demanded action.
By turning colonial resistance into a righteous cause, and by crying the message to all
ranks in all parts of the colonies, ministers did the work of secular radicalism and did it
better: they resolved doubts, overcame inertia, fired the heart, and exalted the soul.
BONOMI, supra note 44, at 216.
69. See KRAMNICK, supra note 4.
70. See Harry S. Stout, Rhetoric and Reality in the Early Republic: The Case of the Federalist
Clergy, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 37, at 62-63 (discussing the July 4,
1812 oration wherein Timothy Dwight, a Federalist clergyman, lamented the absence of God in
the Constitution).
71. U.S. CONST., amend. 1.
72. Early colonial documents, in the form of political covenants, charters, political compacts,
and early constitutions, were often distinctly religious. Not only was God often invoked, but the
structure of the documents themselves were often strongly influenced by covenant theology. See
generally, LuTz, supra note 35, at 13-49. By the time of the Revolution, state constitutions had
been modified and revised along more secular lines, though arguably still reflecting, in the minds
of some, their Puritan origins. Even in more secularized versions, however, documents and state
constitutions in the 1770s and 1780s still retained frequent references to God and even degrees
of religious identity. Most obvious is the Declaration of Independence, which makes several
references to a deity. In addition, many state constitutions retained references to God, including
statements suggesting religious preferences or tests. See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RTS., 1776,
§§ 2 & 3, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
at 15 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (asserting "unalienable right to worship Almighty God," and that
those citizens "professing the Christian religion" should have certain rights); MASS. CONST. 1776,
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The absence of any such reference in the Federal Constitution might
be fairly interpreted as an intentional effort to "secularize" the
document.
To characterize the Constitution as secular, however, is simply to
recognize that it establishes no formal relationship with, or preference
for, religion. As noted by many commentators, the basic constitu-
tional structure, consisting of separation of powers and federalism, is
very compatible with both Protestant and Catholic theology. 73 The ex-
tent that Calvinistic sources might have influenced this structure is
subject to debate. Nevertheless, notions of separation of powers and
federalism are typically seen as consistent with the prevailing Calvinis-
tic theology during the founding. This idea is particularly true with
regard to the concepts of separation of powers and checks and bal-
ances, which are viewed as an appropriate response to the fallen
human condition.74 More broadly, the republican structure of the
Constitution neutralizes the threat of tyrannical selfish "power[,]
while at the same time allowing citizens the freedom to fulfill more
positive human desires, '75 a structure that is very compatible with a
Calvinistic view of the world.
More importantly, the "secular" structure of the Constitution does
not suggest that religion or religious ideas were intended to have a
disfavored status relative to other potential influences. The Constitu-
tion's relative silence on religion, with the exception of the First
Amendment and the ban on religious oaths, is best interpreted as cre-
ating a context of neutrality, in which religious values were to com-
pete on an equal footing with all other values. Rather than giving
religion a preferred status relative to other societal values, the Consti-
tution put religion on the same level as all other possible influences
and values.
The ban on religious tests as a qualification for office found in Arti-
cle VI is certainly consistent with such a religiously neutral under-
standing of the Constitution. The ban in no way precludes religion
from the public realm. Rather, the ban simply prohibits religious be-
Pr. I reprinted in COGAN, supra ("[i]t is the right as well as the duty of all men ... to worship the
SUPREME BEING, the Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe") (emphasis in original).
73. See, e.g., Witte, supra note 6, at 44-63; NOLL, ONE NATION, supra note 5, at 68-70. See
also, Introduction, RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1-8 (Page Smith ed.,
1976) (arguing that the "theoretical foundation of the ... Federal Constitution" was based on
political thought originating in the Protestant Reformation).
74. See, e.g., Witte, supra note 6, at 58-64 (discussing the various checks on the power of those
in political office as a safeguard against tyranny).
75. NOLL, ONE NATION, supra note 5, at 69.
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liefs from being a requirement for a potential officeholder. 76 The clear
purpose of this ban was to preclude the practice of giving preference
to religion found at times in colonial America. Thus, the provision
was to equalize the relative positions of religion and nonreligion. Cur-
rent efforts to preclude religious values from the political landscape
arguably violate the spirit of the religious test ban by suggesting a re-
verse test of sorts, a preclusion of religion as opposed to adherence.
This concept runs contrary to the true purpose of the ban on religious
tests that political participation be made without reference to religious
belief or affiliation.
The primary focus of any constitutional inquiry into the issue of re-
ligion and politics must focus on the First Amendment's religion
clauses, and more specifically, whether these clauses were intended to
preclude religion from politics. Not surprisingly, there is substantial
disagreement over the original purpose of these clauses, and in partic-
ular, the extent to which they were intended to separate the functions
of church and state. Notwithstanding the uncertainty with regards to
these issues, there is little reason to believe that the religion clauses
were intended to exclude religion from the public square. Rather, the
history leading up to and surrounding the adoption of the First
Amendment suggests that the religion clauses were ratified in order to
avoid compelled religious worship and financial support for
churches. 77 There is no evidence suggesting that the religion clauses
were intended to preclude religion from politics.
The historical context during the adoption of the religion clauses
indicates that the primary concerns addressed by the Establishment
Clause were the establishment of a federal church, compelled worship,
and financial support of religion. As often noted, the colonies had a
long history with various established churches,78 which in turn led to a
tension with religious toleration. When the Bill of Rights was
adopted, anywhere from seven to all thirteen states, depending on the
definition, had some type of established church.79 At the earliest
76. Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution provides "... . but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONSi.
art. VI, cl. 3.
77. Commentators have frequently noted that the primary church-state concern in the years
leading up to the ratification of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution was financial
support for churches. See, THOMAS J. CURRY. THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198 (1986).
78. For a discussion of the colonial experience with established churches, see CURRY, supra
note 77, at 1-77; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 1-26 (1994).
79. Scholars differ widely in the manner in which they count the number of established
churches, depending on how the term "established church" or "establishment" is defined. For
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stages of colonial development, establishment included a litany of
church-state connections, such as voting restrictions and compulsory
church attendance. 80 However, by the time the Constitution was rati-
fied, the concept of establishment was limited to various forms of fi-
nancial support for churches, religious tests for office, and official
state recognition of religion."'
This longstanding, and to some degree continuing, focus on the fi-
nancial support of religion has often been viewed as the impetus for
the religion clauses. The Supreme Court,82 and many historians, have
looked to the debate regarding religious assessments in Virginia in
1786, in particular Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, 83 as providing some evidence of the principles
underlying the Establishment Clause. Madison's Remonstrance, writ-
ten in opposition to a proposed assessment to support churches in Vir-
ginia, was directed toward government financial support of religion
and the harm it posed to the liberty of conscience and the free exer-
cise of religion. Subsequently, this document gave rise to the Virginia
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which similarly focused on
financial support, asserting "[t]hat no man shall be compelled to fre-
quent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever
"84
The exact meaning that should be given to Madison's Remon-
strance remains open to some debate, including whether it opposed
any financial aid, or only that aid preferential to certain sects.85 Today,
example, five states at the time of the Bill of Rights continued to provide financial support for
churches, six gave official recognition to particular denominations, and five required assent to
Biblical inspiration. Moreover, all but two (Virginia and Rhode Island) still had religious tests
for office. See generally, ANSON STOKES AND LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITE I3 SirAES 78-82 (1964) (detailing the array of church-state contacts that existed at the time
of the drafting of the Federal Constitution); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment
Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REv. 1, 2 (1996) (noting the different state positions). Gerard
Bradley states that "each of the thirteen original states generously aided and promoted religion
and should therefore, according to [Leonard] Levy's methodology, be called establishment re-
gimes." GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 13 (1987).
80. See LEVY, supra note 78, at 1-5.
81. See generally, CURRY, supra note 77, at 134-92.
82. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28
(1974): Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
83. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (Jun. 20,
1785). in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 298-304 (Robert A. Rutland et. al. eds., 1973).
The Memorial and Remonstrance is also reprinted as an appendix in Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72.
For a discussion of the events surrounding Madison's Remonstrance, see SToKES, supra note 79,
at 65-71; CURRY, supra note 77, at 134-48; LEVY, supra note 78, at 58-69.
84. See Bill for Religious Freedom 1786, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 52.
85. See Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 854-863 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the differing views on whether Madison's Remonstrance opposed all financial
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the more significant inquiry is how to apply these concerns in the era
of large government and the administrative state.8 6 However, it is
clear that to the extent the Virginia assessment debate illuminates the
religion clauses, and there is some question whether it does, it indi-
cates that the Remonstrance was aimed at government contributions
to support religious practices, and in no way suggests that religiously
informed morals and values are inappropriate to politics.8 7
To the extent that other states addressed church-state issues in the
years immediately proceeding the Constitution, they also focused on
compelled worship and on state sponsored financial support for
churches. Historian Leonard Levy has noted that the Revolution pro-
vided an opportunity for the individual states to revisit their constitu-
tions. In many instances, the states used the occasion to address
aid to churches or only preferential aid). More generally, there has been a debate over the years
whether the Establishment Clause is meant to preclude financial aid to religion in general, or
only aid that prefers some religions over others. For arguments that only preferential aid is
prohibited, see MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLITics: THE INTENTION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1978); BRADLEY, supra note 79. For arguments rejecting such a view, arguing that
the Establishment Clause is not limited to only preferentialist aid, see LEVY, supra note 78, at
112-45; Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original In-
tent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). The Supreme Court itself, however, in Everson,
clearly rejected the view that the Establishment Clause only prohibits preferential aid. 330 U.S.
at 15-16.
86. See Donald A. Giannella, Religions Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment: Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1968) (noting the
distinct problems posed to Establishment Clause analysis in the era of the large administrative
state); Robert A. Destro, Equal Treatment: lnplications for Nonprofit Organizations, in EQUAL
TREATMENTOF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, 101, 102-05, 117-35 (Steven V. Monsma &
J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998) (discussing the implications of funding religious charities in the
era of the large administrative state).
87. The historical context in which the Remonstrance was written, and Madison's opposition
to a general assessment for the financial support of churches, clearly indicate that the Remon-
strance was directed to the issue of state financial support of religion. Indeed, the title is Memo-
rial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, further indicating its specific focus. The
Remonstrance itself is divided into fifteen short arguments against assessments, none of which
reasonably can be interpreted as suggesting religious values should be banned from politics.
Although most of the arguments focus on the ill effects assessments would have on religion itself
and liberty of conscience, several also allude to the problems religious establishments can inflict
on government. These include supporting tyranny and government's use of religion to subvert
liberty. In discussing ill effects of religion on civil authority, however, Madison was clearly refer-
ring to state established churches, state clergy and the intolerance that can result from such a
scheme (see argument number eight in particular). The Remonstrance does not in any way sug-
gest the impropriety of religiously informed political judgments. See Madison, supra note 83, at
298-304. Indeed, when Madison was confronted with the issue of whether clergy should be eligi-
ble for public office, he strongly opposed attempts to ban them in Virginia, arguing that a ban
would constitute an infringement of their civil liberties. See infra notes 109-115 and accompany-
ing text.
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"pent-up" concerns over forced establishments of religion.8 8 In fact,
between 1776 and 1784, almost every state adopted a new constitu-
tion, and in most cases provisions were added which were aimed at
eliminating or reducing church establishments. These provisions took
various forms, with some states prohibiting establishments altogether
while other state constitutions maintained a form of establishment but
lessened its rigidity. 9 To the extent specific concerns were addressed,
however, they consistently revolved around the dual concerns of com-
pelled financial support and compelled worship.
The fact that these dual concerns were the impetus behind anti-es-
tablishment provisions is seen in several states which most severely
limited establishments. For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution
of [776 provided that, "no man ought to or of right can be compelled
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of wor-
ship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free
will or consent ..... ,9 Provisions in New Jersey,91 North Carolina, 92
and Vermont 93 similarly prohibited compelled worship and financial
support of churches. Several other states, though recognizing an es-
88. See LEVY, supra note 78. at 27. Both Levy and Thomas Curry persuasively suggest that
the changes taking place in state establishment clauses in the years preceding the drafting of the
federal Constitution provide evidence of the church-state concerns animating the First Amend-
ment. See id.: CURRY, supra note 77. at 134.
89. For a general discussion of the changes that occurred during this time, see LEvY, supra
note 78, at 27-78.
90. See PA. CONST. 1776 ch. I. § 11, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 31.
91. Section XVIll of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided:
THAr no person ever within this Colony be deprived of the inestimable Privilege of
worshiping Almighty Gooi in a Manner agreeable to the Dictates of his own Con-
science; nor under any Pretense whatsoever compelled to attend any Place of Worship
contrary to his own Faith and Judgment: nor shall any Person within this Colony ever
be obligated to pay tithes, taxes or any other Rates, for the Purpose of building or
repairing any Church or Churches. Place or Places of Worship, or for the Maintenance
of any Minister or Ministry, contrary to what he believes to be Right, or has deliber-
ately or voluntarily engaged himself to perform.
Reprinted in COGAN, supra note 65. at 25.
92. Section XXIV of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided:
That there shall be no Establishment of any one Religious Church in this State in Pref-
erence to any other; neither shall any Person, on any Pretense whatsoever, be com-
pelled to attend any Place of Worship contrary to his own Faith or Judgment; nor be
obliged to pay for the purchase of any Glebe. or the building of any House of Worship,
or for the Maintenance of any building or house or worship, or for the Maintenance of
any Minster or Ministry, contrary to what he believes right, or has voluntarily and per-
sonally engaged to perform ....
Reprinted in COGAN. supra note 72. at 30-31.
93. Chapter 1, section 3 of the Vermont Constitution of 1777 provides in part: "no Man ought
or of Right can be compelled to attend any religious Worship, or erect, or support any Place of
Worship, or maintain any Minister contrary to the Dictates of his Conscience ...." Reprinted in
COGAN, supra note 72, at 41.
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tablished church or permitting financial support, made changes di-
rected toward compelled worship and financial support of churches.
The Maryland Declaration of Rights stated that no person shall be
"compelled to frequent or maintain, or contribute... [t]o any particu-
lar place of worship, or any particular ministry .. . . 94 However, the
Maryland Constitution allowed the legislature to levy a general tax for
the support of religion, granting each person the power to decide
where the money would go.95 South Carolina and Georgia had similar
provisions, which prohibited compelled worship or financial support
of churches, but permitted, with consent, taxation for one's own pro-
fessed religion.96
These state constitutional provisions enacted in the years immedi-
ately proceeding the Federal Constitution arguably provide the best
insights into the church-state concerns which eventually animated the
First Amendment. While permitting varying degrees of continued re-
ligious establishment, state constitutions reflect a definite trend to-
ward eliminating or loosening perceived establishments of religion.
To the extent that particular concerns were identified, however, they
consistently addressed the dual problems of compelled worship and
financial support of churches and ministry. This is the one consistent
theme that emerges in most state constitutional provisions enacted at
this time, and strongly suggests that any emerging opposition to estab-
lished churches involved these matters. Even these concerns were not
universally shared, since some states continued previously established
practices of financial support to churches.9 7 However, the opposition
that was emerging during this period was directed to financial support
and compelled worship. Madison's Remonstrance expressed the same
concerns, thereby further confirming the centrality of those ideas in
the formative period leading up to the Federal Establishment
Clause. 98
94. MD. DECLARATION Ris. OF 1776, § 33-4, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 17-18.
95. See Mo. DECLARATION RTs. OF t776, § 33-4, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 17-18.
96. See GA. CONST. 1777, § LVI, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 16; S.C. CONs'r. 1778,
§ XXXVIII, reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 39-41.
97. For example, both Massachusetts and Connecticut continued state financial support of
established churches. See LEVY, supra note 78, at 29-49.
98. This analysis is also shared by two recent and well-received books examining the history of
the Establishment Clause: Thomas Curry's The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to
the Passage of the First Amendment and Leonard Levy's The Establishment Clause: Religion and
The First Amendment. Although disagreeing on several fundamental issues, they both view con-
cerns about state financial support of churches as the dominant issue during this time. Curry
asserts that "during the revolutionary period, the only serious church-state conflicts had to do"
with "non-preferential state support" of religion. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 198. Although
Curry concluded that no consensus was reached on the issue, concerns about financial support of
churches animated the debate immediately proceeding the framing of the Constitution. Simi-
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It was in the context of church-state events, with dual concerns re-
garding financial support and compelled worship, that the First
Amendment was proposed and adopted. The Bill of Rights, begin-
ning with the First Amendment, was established to secure the ratifica-
tion of several states.99 Although most federalists did not consider a
Bill of Rights necessary,""' they nevertheless supported its adoption to
quiet those who used its absence as a reason to oppose ratification.
This later group likely included those who used the issue as a reason
to oppose the Constitution, and others who were sincerely concerned
about protection of basic rights, including religious freedom.10'
The limited information available about the perceived need for the
religion clauses on the part of some states, and on the actual discus-
sions at the convention drafting the provisions, offer little to support
the argument that they were intended to exclude religion from polit-
ics. Scholars have noted that state debates over the need for a Bill of
Rights involved surprisingly little discussion regarding an Establish-
ment Clause. Moreover, the discussion that occured tended to be of a
general nature. To the extent that reasons were identified, the draft-
ers focused on concerns that a national government might be used to
limit rights of conscience, concerns about the establishment of a na-
tional church, and concerns about giving preference to any one relig-
ion. 10 2 There was no recorded discussion which even remotely
suggested a separation of religion from politics.
larly, Levy's analysis of the period immediately proceeding the Revolution also identifies finan-
cial support as being the central issue during the debate. See LEVY, supra note 78, at 27-78.
Other commentators have similarly stated that financial aid to churches was the dominant
church-state issue in the 1780s leading up to the Bill of Rights. See Douglas Laycock, The Un-
derlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L. J. 43, 48 (1997).
99. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 193-95. It is also important to note that what is now our First
Amendment was originally proposed as the Third Amendment. It became the First Amendment
when the original first two amendments failed to be ratified. See AKHIL REE AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION ANI) RECONSTRUCTION 8-19 (1998).
100. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 194; LEVY supra note 78, at 81-83.
101. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 194-95.
102. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 194-98. Curry states that in state debates over the need to
add a Bill of Rights to the federal Constitution, "[c]ommentators ... failed to address the ques-
tion of religious freedom at great length or in detail." Id. at 195. Comments concerning estab-
lishments of religion were of a general nature and quite limited. To the extent such comments
were made, they addressed concerns over establishing a national religion and in particular con-
cerns of preferring one religion over others. Curry notes that this focus on avoiding preferences
of one religion over others stands in contrast to debates in the states over their own establish-
ments. These debates did not concern "exclusive state preferences for a single religion, but
[rather] proposals for non-preferential state support of many religious groups." /d. at 197-98.
Leonard Levy has similarly noted that although much was said in the states of the need for a Bill
of Rights, extremely little was said about the meaning to be given to specific rights. LEVY, supra
note 71, at 84-85. This was particularly true of the subject of religion and establishment, which
"was rarely mentioned at all and then only briefly." Id. at 85. Levy then spends eight pages
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Similarly, the Annals of Congress, which summarized the House
discussions in drafting and adopting the First Amendment, offer no
evidence of concerns about religion and politics. The original wording
of what has become our modern day religion clauses stated as follows:
"[T]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor
shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any matter, or on any
pretext, infringed.' 10 3 In the limited information on the debate of this
initial proposal or subsequent revisions, there is no evidence that re-
ligious intrusion into politics was a concern. 0 4 The brief recorded dis-
cussions in the House provide little insight into the rationales
supporting the First Amendment's adoption. The discussions involved
are brief, unfocused, and rather ambiguous in nature. 10 5 Whatever one
makes of these discussions, there is absolutely no hint that religion in
politics was a concern.
Similarly, there is nothing in the limited Senate record that suggests
concerns about religious influences on politics. The Senate proceed-
ings were completely secret, and as a result, there exists only a record
of motions and votes recorded in the Senate Journal, and limited
newspaper accounts. 10 6 This background provides little grounds for
analysis, but the little information that has survived fails to support
the idea that the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude relig-
ion as a basis for political decision making. The Senate debate, as
discerned through a comparison of defeated and accepted motions,
reflects a clash between those who would prohibit any government
support of religion, and those who would prohibit only preferential
aid. Although there was no clear winner in the Senate, the final word-
surveying the little that was said about establishment concerns in the state debates over the need
for a Bill of Rights. The statements were all of a general nature, with a number directed to
concerns of preferring one religion or another. There is no evidence in any of the statements,
however, about the need to exclude religion from politics. See id. at 86-93.
103. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 199 (quoting and discussing Madison's original proposal).
104. For a substantial analysis of the debates over the First Amendment found in the ANNALS,
see CURRY, supra note 77, at 198-209; MALBIN, supra note 85 at 3-13. Neither Curry, nor Malbin
indicate that there was any concern expressed over religion in politics, nor was there any discus-
sion regarding the First Amendment preclusion of religion from politics. See also, Edward Mc-
Glynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court
in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L. J. 205, 215-16 (1980) (stating that
the Annals contain no indication that the Founders were concerned about political divisiveness
along religious lines).
105. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., 757-59 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789) (House debate on religion
clauses). The brief debate is reproduced in full in both CURRY, supra note 77, at 200-02, and
LEVY, supra note 78, at 96-98.
106. For analysis of the Senate deliberations, see CURRY, supra note 77, at 206-07 and LEVY,
supra note 78, at 102-04.
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ing that emerged from a joint House-Senate conference committee
appears to be reflective of a more general prohibition. 107 In any event,
there is no suggestion that the amendment was to act as a bar to relig-
ious beliefs in politics.
Thus, the historical context and concerns giving rise to the First
Amendment religion clauses, and the limited record surrounding their
adoption, do not support exclusion of religious values from politics.
Rather, the best understanding of the clauses, as reflected in the sig-
nificant changes in state constitutions immediately proceeding the
Federal Constitution, is that they were animated by concerns over
compelled worship and financial support of churches. Furthermore,
the clauses were not intended to separate religion from politics. This
understanding is further supported by the strong religious views of
citizens at the time and the consequent political expression which em-
bodied these views.
In the absence of any clear discussion or debate on the issue, it is
hard to imagine that the First Amendment was intended to disconnect
religion from public life. Rather, historians have commonly noted
that the prevailing and common expectation was that government
would uphold the "Protestant ethos and morality."10 8 This expectation
is reflected in the common and continued practices of Sabbath laws,
chaplains, and days of prayer. 10 9 Whether or not such practices should
be viewed as constitutional today, they evidence the common assump-
tion that religion had a societal and public component.
One possible objection to this view, or perceived restriction on re-
ligious involvement in politics that existed at the time, were the
prohibitions on clergy which barred them from holding political office.
These prohibitions existed in some state constitutions and were struck
down in McDaniel v. Paty."0 Modeled after common provisions in
England, seven of the original thirteen states, and six subsequent
states, adopted various prohibitions on clergy holding office.11 ' Such
107. Any conclusions drawn from the sketchy House and Senate records regarding how the
"non-preferentialist" debate was resolved must be cautious at best. Yet several persuasive argu-
ments have been made that, when considered as a whole, the final wording was intended to
prohibit any financial support of religion, and not just preferential support. See Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); LEVY, supra note 78, at 102-04; Laycock,
supra note 85, at 875. What is significant, however, is that this focus on financial aid to religion
appears to be a primary impetus behind the religion clauses, with no suggestion that they were
intended to ban religion from politics.
11)8. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 219.
11)9. See CURRY, supra note 77, at 219; NOLL, HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 8, at 145.
110. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
111. See id. at 622. As noted in McDaniel, all but two of those states had abandoned the
prohibitions by the end of the Nineteenth Century. Id. at 625.
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prohibitions might understandably be viewed as an attempt to drive a
wedge between religion and politics, thus supporting an argument that
a disassociation of religion from politics was an implicit societal un-
derstanding at the time the First Amendment was adopted.
Such an argument is problematic for several reasons. First, the ap-
parent purpose of such provisions was not to exclude religion from
politics, but rather to ensure the proper devotion of clergy to their
religious calling and to avoid the undue pressure to give financial sup-
port to churches. As noted in McDaniel, the American provisions
were modeled on English provisions whose purpose was to ensure
that clergy were not distracted from their calling and to avoid certain
conflicts with the Crown.' 12 Though a precise understanding of the
American provisions is uncertain, the few state provisions that specifi-
cally articulated a rationale stated that it was to ensure devotion to the
clergy's higher calling.' 1 3 Although no other official reasons were
given, the provisions might also have been motivated in part to avoid
clergy asserting inordinate pressure to increase financial support for
churches. This latter concern was a particular problem because unlike
the federal structure, some states had established churches which re-
ceived financial support. Therefore, to the extent that the provisions
were intended to restrain political involvement, the specific fear was
not that religious values would influence politics, but rather that
clergy would use their office to affect the financial support their
churches received.
Second, as emphasized in McDaniel, the Federal Constitution did
not adopt such a provision. Additionally, there is no evidence that
such a provision was considered.' 14 This is not surprising, since a pro-
vision banning clergy from political office would have been in substan-
tial tension with both the Free Exercise Clause and the ban on
religious oaths. In any event, the absence of such a federal provision
indicates that whatever minor restrictions were intended to apply in
112. See id. at 622-23.
113. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. 1777, art. XXXIX.
AND WHEREAS the Ministers of the Gospel are, by their Profession, dedicated to
the Service of God and the Cure of Souls, and not to be diverted from the great Duties
of their Function; therefore no Minister of the Gospel, or Priest of any Denomination
whatsoever, shall at any Time hereafter, under any Pretense or Description whatever,
be eligible to, or capable of holding any civil or military Office or Place, within this
state.
Reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 26.
A similar provision was contained in the South Carolina Constitution of 1778 in article XXI,
reprinted in COGAN, supra note 72, at 39.
114. See 435 U.S. at 623-25.
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states with such provisions, they were not present in the federal
scheme.
It is also significant that Madison strenuously opposed such a prohi-
bition when Thomas Jefferson proposed one for the Virginia Constitu-
tion. Madison viewed such a prohibition as contrary to notions of
both liberty and justice. It was his belief that such prohibitions pun-
ished the religious profession, depriving them of a civil right. 115 This
view is significant in understanding the absence of such a provision in
the Federal Constitution. Additionally, this view is supportive of the
more general neutrality interpretation of the First Amendment. In
particular, Madison's view suggests that religious beliefs or standing
should not be a basis for political disqualification. Such a reading is
consistent with a secular view of the Constitution, which neither pre-
fers nor disqualifies religious views. Instead, such a reading allows for
the competition of a multitude of ideologies on an equal basis. Even
Jefferson, who originally supported disqualification provisions be-
cause he feared clergy might be elevated above other professions and
therefore their views might carry inordinate weight, later changed his
opinion because he realized that clergy stood on the same footing as
all others.' 16
Therefore, the historical setting of the Constitution and the religion
clauses offer scant evidence for the exclusion of religious beliefs as a
basis for political decision making. The concerns animating the Estab-
lishment Clause were those of compulsory attendance and financial
support of churches, with no mention of political participation. The
115. Madison strongly opposed such a clergy disqualification provision, viewing it as a be-
trayal of the Constitution's "impartiality" and punishing the religious profession by deprivation
of a "civil right." He stated:
Does not the exclusion of Ministers of the Gospel as such violate a fundamental princi-
ple of liberty by punishing a religious profession with the deprivation of a civil right?
does it [not] violate another article of the plan itself which exempts religion from the
cognizance of Civil power? does it not violate justice by at once taking away a right
and prohibiting a compensation for it? does it not in fine violate impartiality by shut-
ting the door [against] the Ministers of one Religion and leaving it open for those of
every other.
5 WRITINGS or JAMES MADISON 288 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1904) (as it appears in the original).
116. In a letter written in 1800, Jefferson suggested that his earlier concern was based on the
clergy's potential to be elevated above other professions, and thus, if elected, they might "have
been a very formidable engine against the civil and religious rights of man." 9 THE WORKS OF
JEFFERSON 143 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). Jefferson further stated as follows:
Even in 1783 we doubted the stability of our recent measure for reducing them to the
footing of other useful callings. It now appears that our means were effectual. The
clergy here seem to have relinquished all pretensions to privilege, and to stand on a
footing with lawyers, physicians, & c. They ought therefore to possess the same rights.
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resulting secular state is best seen as one in which religion is neither
preferred, nor prohibited.
Finally, such an understanding of religion and politics is consistent
with the political vision inherent in Madison's celebrated Federalist
Number 10, wherein he argues for the advantages of a well con-
structed union as a safeguard against the problem of political fac-
tions.' 17 Madison notes that the problem of factions can be addressed
either by removing its causes, or by controlling its effects. He rejects
the former as sacrificing liberty, and prescribing a cure worse than the
disease.' 1 8 Therefore, Madison asserts that the proper solution is to be
found not in removing the causes of factions, but in controlling their
effects.11 9 The effects of factions are controlled through a representa-
tive government which provides several safeguards against factions.
Representative government insures that views are passed through and
evaluated by a select body of representatives. Moreover, the sheer
size of this larger republic further decreases the likelihood that one
faction will dominate the entire population. 20
Significantly, Madison mentions religion several times as a source
that might give rise to political factions.12' Although this cannot be
117. See THE FEDERALISF No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate rights of the commu-
nity." Id. at 78.
118. Regarding the inadvisability of removing the causes of factions, Madison concluded as
follows:
There are two methods of removing the causes of factions: the one, by destroying the
liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the
disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly
expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political
life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which
is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the
reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions
will be formed . . . . The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The
protection of these faculties is the first object of government.
Id.
119. See id. at 80.
120. See id. at 82-84.
121. Madison suggested that factions have their "latent causes ... sown in the nature of man"
and that we "see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity." He then elabo-
rates on several sources: "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning govern-
ment, and many other points, as well as speculation of practice; an attachment to different
leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power ..... Id. at 79. Importantly, he
does not see these sources, including religion, as the most common source of factions. Rather,
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interpreted as a clear statement by Madison regarding the propriety of
religion in politics, it demonstrates that Madison assumed that religion
would be involved in politics. The solutions to problems associated
with religion or any other source lie not in removing that source, since
such action would infringe on liberty, but rather in the political struc-
ture that Madison proposed and was subsequently adopted. Federal-
ist No. 10, therefore, seems to implicitly endorse Madison's earlier
position opposing a ban on members of the clergy holding office, sug-
gesting instead that religion should be treated the same as any other
source of political values, neither preferred nor punished.
122
In sum, there is little reason to view the Constitution in general, and
the adoption of the First Amendment in particular, as evidencing an
intent to separate religious views from the political process. The re-
sulting constitutional structure is best seen as neither preferring nor
punishing religious views. Moreover, despite the ambiguity surround-
ing many Establishment Clause issues, there is nothing in the context
"the most common and durable source of factions has been the verious and unequal distribution
of property." Id.
122. For a more extensive argument that the principles in Federalist No. 10 support equal
access of religious convictions to the political arena, see Smith, supra note 1, at 1612-26. Profes-
sor Christopher Eisgruber has also written at length about the problem of religious factions and
Madison's proposed solution in Federalist No. 10. See Christopher Eisgruber, Madison's Wager:
Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U.L. REV. 347, 369-77 (1995). Eisgruber
believes there is a constitutional commitment to public deliberation and reason, and partly for
that reason religious factions are particularly problematic, since they "represent[ ] a challenge to
reason's authority." Id. at 360-69. However, Eisgruber asserts that the constitutional response
to that challenge is not trying to preclude religion from politics through Establishment Clause
doctrine, but rather a structural response found in the Constitution to control the problem of
religious factions. This includes the controls provided by a large and diverse republic identified
by Madison in Federalist No. 10, and "commercialism that diminishes religious intensity[ ] [and]
public schools that habituate students to secular discussion." Id. at 381-86, 408. He concludes
that those devices have been "so successful that the principal task of [constitutional] doctrine is
to see that religion is treated no differently than anything else." Id. at 409.
Professor Ruti Teitel, however, has argued that the problems of religious factions discussed in
Federalist No. 10 buttress the argument for excluding religion from politics. In particular, she
argues that Madison was concerned about the problems posed by religious factions, and that
Federalist No. 10 reflected a "preconstitutional view that religion should remain separate from
public life." See Teitel, supra note 4, at 818-20. Although Madison was certainly concerned
about religious factions, there are several problems with Teitel's position. First, Federalist No. 10
does not treat religion as unique, but includes it as one of several types of factions that might
pose problems. Indeed, Madison did not consider religious factions the most problematic, argu-
ing that it was the "verious and unequal distribution of property" that was "the most common
and durable source of factions." FEDERALIs5 No. 10, supra note 117, at 79. Second, and most
important, the solution proposed was not to limit political participation, which Madison consid-
ered a restraint on liberty and a cure worse than a disease, but rather to employ a republican
form of national government. Id. at 78. Finally, the preconstitutional condition was not one in
which religion was relegated to a private sphere, but instead one in which religion was actively
involved in the political life of the nation. See part IA, supra.
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of the First Amendment's adoption or discussions that suggests it was
intended to eliminate religion as a source of political decision making.
Rather, the Establishment Clause was directed to concerns about
compelled worship and financial support of churches. Similarly, the
secular structure of the Constitution is best seen as an effort to avoid
any endorsement of, or relationship to religion, in essence placing re-
ligion in the same class as any other ideology.
As a practical matter, the founders and the general public probably
gave little thought to whether religious values could form the basis for
political views; there was simply an assumption that religious values
often would. As noted by historian Mark Noll, none of the founders
opposed resorting to religious arguments for establishing public pol-
icy.123 The secular state was to be neutral toward ideologies, religious
or otherwise. To the extent that divisions, factions, or other problems
might arise, such problems would be addressed through the structure
of our representative government.
This understanding is certainly reflected in the subsequent history
of our nation. Whatever the views of the founders, religion early and
often inserted itself into the political affairs of our nation. As early as
the Presidential election of 1800, there was substantial religious oppo-
sition by clergy and others to the election of Thomas Jefferson, who
was viewed as hostile in some respects to religious interests. 124 Relig-
ion's involvement in American politics has remained strong ever
since, finding expression in diverse ways. Most obvious are the high
visibility social movements, such as abolition, temperance, and civil
rights, all of which had strong religious dimensions. 125 Recent studies
have also highlighted the considerable ways religion influenced politi-
cal parties and platforms, specifically in the Nineteenth Century.
126
More importantly, the devoutly religious look to their religion for
moral and ethical standards, which in turn are often reflected in the
political choices they make. This idea, of course, is difficult to mea-
sure, though several relatively recent studies suggest that religion,
combined with ethnicity, was the major predictor of voting patterns in
this country until at least the 1930s. 127
123. See NOLL, HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 8, at 148.
124. See NOLL, ONE NATION, supra note 5, at 75-89 (discussing religious opposition to Jeffer-
son in 1800 presidential election).
125. See supra note 9.
126. See HOWE, supra note 10, at 150-80 (examining the significant influence of Evangelical
thought on Whig politics);
127. See Robert P. Swierenga, Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Cen-
tury: Voting, Values, Cultures, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLrIICS, supra note 11, at 146. 147
(summarizing the evidence that "religion was the salient factor in Nineteenth Century voting
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The long and substantial involvement of religion in politics in our
nation's history does not in and of itself legitimize it as a practice.
This commingling of interests suggests, however, that our political ex-
perience has reflected the picture presented at our founding, in which
religious values were not intended to be excluded from the political
arena. The next section of this article will examine how this is also
consistent with the jurisprudence of the First Amendment, as reflected
in both the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses.
1I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ESTABLISHMENT AND SPEECH
As noted earlier, few scholars today would argue that the use of
religious beliefs in politics constitutes an actual violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. In fact, many scholars concerned about religion's in-
volvement in politics have noted that any attempt to exclude religious
input would in fact violate the free speech of religious proponents. 28
Despite this recognition, Establishment Clause concerns remain
strong among those who wish to exclude religion from politics. Pro-
ponents of this view argue that the principles underlying the religion
clauses suggest that religion should be excluded or greatly limited in
politics. 129 Moreover, these same proponents occasionally assert that
particular laws are infirm because of their religious input. These ad-
vocates have even found support in isolated statements by Supreme
Court Justices, most notably Justice Stevens. 130
An analysis of whether faith-informed politics raise Establishment
Clause concerns involves two closely related, yet distinct issues. The
first issue involves the legitimacy of religious adherents' reliance upon
religion in making political decisions. The second issue concerns the
validity of legislation that was motivated in whole or in part by relig-
ious beliefs. Douglas Laycock has identified these questions as "issues
of inputs and outputs.' 13 1 This section will examine the first issue,
which goes to the heart of the religion and politics debate. As noted
by other scholars, this issue includes dual establishment and speech
behavior" and noting that recent research has shown religion "the key variable in voting behav-
ior until at least the Great Depression").
128. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 2, at 196.
129. See supra note 15.
130. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that to be consistent with the First Amendment, "states
interests must be secular," and "the state may not promote a theological or sectarian interest");
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 565-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing restrictions on abortion violate Establishment Clause);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (same).
131. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 795.
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concerns, both of which will be examined here. Section III will ex-
amine the issue of outputs. 132
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence found its genesis in the
Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education.133
During the half-century since Everson, the Court has struggled to es-
tablish a consistent and coherent approach to resolving church-state
issues. Even more difficult have been scholarly attempts to make
sense out of the Court's Establishment Clause analysis. Despite sig-
nificant disagreements over the results, most commentators agree in
their lament over the Court's often incomprehensible and inconsis-
tently applied set of principles. 134
Recent scholarly attempts at understanding the Supreme Court's
treatment of the clauses emphasize two separate theories underlying
many of the Court's decisions, separationism and neutrality. 135 Argua-
bly, these concepts find their origins in Everson. In Everson, the
Court considered the validity of reimbursing parents of parochial
school students for transportation costs.1 36 The Court, referring to Jef-
ferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists, emphasized that there was to
be a wall of separation between church and state, which the Court
declared was to be "high and impenetrable." 137 Despite this language,
the Court upheld the reimbursement of transportation costs. The
132. See infra notes 278-337 and accompanying text.
133. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
134. Many commentators have criticized the Court's Establishment Clause analysis, and in
particular, the Lemon test. See Jesse Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools - An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); William Marshall, "We Know It When We See It":
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Reflections
on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997
(1986). Steven Smith has noted that dissatisfaction with Establishment Clause results unites
almost everyone on both sides of the issue, stating "[i]n a rare and remarkable way, the Supreme
Court's establishment clause jurisprudence has unified critical opinion: people who disagree
about nearly everything else in the law agree that establishment doctrine is seriously, perhaps
distinctively, defective." Smith, supra note 1, at 956.
135. For an elaboration upon the theories of separationism and neutrality, see Dhananjai
Shirakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C. R. - C. L. L. REV. 505 (1998); Carl
H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case For Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service
Providers, 46 EMORY L. J. 1 (1997); John H. Garvey, What's Next After Separationism?, 46 EM-
ORY L. REV. 75 (1997); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 230 (1994). Douglas Laycock, however, has criticized the distinction between separation-
ism and neutrality theories, suggesting that the Court has never seen the two in conflict. Lay-
cock instead suggests that the two competing theories in the context of government aid are the
"no-aid" theory and the "nondiscrimination" theory. See Laycock, supra note 98 at 46.
136. 330 U.S. at 3.
137. Id. at 16, 18.
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Court did not find a violation of the Establishment Clause because the
reimbursement program did not favor or prefer religion; rather, it pro-
vided benefits equal to that given to public school students. The
Court stated that the First Amendment "requires the state to be neu-
tral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believ-
ers."' 138 Thus, despite the rhetoric of separation in Everson, the Court
in essence applied a neutrality standard. 39
During the half-century since Everson, these themes have played
out in Establishment Clause cases. A number of recent articles have
viewed separationism as the primary theoretical approach for much of
this time, while giving way in recent years to neutrality. 140 The separa-
tionism approach is perhaps best illustrated by the Court's threefold
test for deciding Establishment Clause cases as set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.14 1 In Lemon, the Court synthesized Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to date, and articulated the following test: "[F]irst, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the act must not foster an excessive entanglement with relig-
ion."' 4 2 This test dominated Establishment Clause analysis during
much of the 1970s and 1980s, and has not been formally overruled.
The Lemon test and many of its results have often been viewed as
separationist in nature. Although on occasion the Court has raised
concerns about a valid secular purpose, 43 most often it has relied on
138. Id. at 18.
139. In dissent, Justice Jackson noted the tension between the majority's rhetoric of separa-
tion and its result, stating "the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompro-
mising separation ... seem entirely discordant with its conclusion . I..." ld. at 19. The answer, of
course, often noted by the Court, is that the required separationism is not nearly as extreme as
suggested by the language in Everson, but rather allows a number of contacts between church
and state. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 671-72 (1970) (noting that the required
separation still permits numerous contacts, with the results of Everson just one example); see
also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) ("total separation of the two is not possible");
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("total separation between church and state" not
required nor possible); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760 (1973) ("[i]t has never been thought either possi-
ble or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952) (the Constitution does not require separation "in every and all respects").
140. See Esbeck, supra note 135, at 20-39; Lupa supra note 135, at 233-67; Shivakumar, supra
note 135, at 505-57; Garvey, supra note 135, at 78-83.
141. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
142. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). Although in Lemon the test was applied to statutes, it is
applicable to any government action.
143. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding Arkansas law that required
teaching creation when evolution is taught invalid because it did not have a valid secular pur-
pose). The Court, however, has generally applied the secular purpose requirement in a very
deferential manner, finding it met if there is any ostensible secular purpose. See, e.g., Witters v.
Washington Dep't. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-86 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 394-5; Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1982). See also, Edwards v.
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the second and third prongs of the test in finding constitutional viola-
tions. This has been particularly true with regard to programs giving
aid to sectarian schools. 144 The Court has invalidated programs that
provided counseling and therapy services to parochial schools,145 re-
imbursed schools for testing costs, 14 6 provided remedial courses to pa-
rochial schools, 147 and provided sectarian schools with federally
funded Title I services. 148 The Court has also used Lemon to strike
down government sponsorship of religious activity such as creches,
149
and the posting of the Ten Commandments in a public school. 50
These decisions built on landmark cases predating Lemon where the
Court held that required religious activities in public schools, such as
prayer and Bible reading, violated the Establishment Clause. 15'
Despite these results, the separationism of Lemon and its progeny is
in fact limited and qualified in several respects. First, in addressing
aid cases, the Court has drawn a distinction between aid that is "direct
and substantial" and "indirect and incidental." The former is gener-
ally held invalid, the later valid.' 52 On that basis, the Court has upheld
several aid programs involving textbooks, 53 transportation costs,'154
and even a state income tax deduction for parochial school ex-
penses 55 if such aid was simply part of a broader program benefiting
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 613 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[a]lmost invariably, we have discov-
ered a secular purpose for measures challenged under the Establishment Clause, typically devot-
ing no more than a sentence or two to the matter").
144. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding salary supplements for paro-
chial school teachers invalid); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756 (holding reimbursement for portion of
parochial school tuition invalid); see generally, JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1235-66 (5th ed., 1999) (reviewing aid to religious school cases).
145. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
146. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
147. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
148. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
149. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
150. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
151. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (holding voluntary Bible
reading violates Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) (holding that
government sponsored prayer in school violates Establishment Clause). In a more recent deci-
sion, the Court held that a state initiated graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause,
but ignored the Lemon analysis in reaching its result. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
152. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393 (1985) ("[t]he question in each
case must be whether the effect of the proffered aid is 'direct and substantial' or 'indirect and
incidental"'). See generally, Esbeck, supra note 135, at 6-10 (discussing direct/indirect distinction
in aid cases and noting how the Court has consistently permitted "indirect" forms of assistance).
153. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
154. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
155. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388.
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public as well as private school children. 56 The Court has also per-
mitted a creche display under Lemon,157 as well as upholding the prac-
tice of opening legislative sessions with prayer without mentioning
Lemon. 58
Thus, rather than representing a "high and impenetrable" wall,
separationism under Lemon has been blurred and qualified, permit-
ting a variety of church-state contacts. 159 The fine line drawing that
the Lemon test requires has led a number of commentators on both
sides of the Establishment Clause issue to criticize it as uncertain and
inconsistent. 160 However, the Lemon test has shown that even under
what is considered a separationist approach, the Court has not called
for a complete separation of religion from public life.
More importantly, to the extent Lemon reflects separationism, it
has been focused on a relatively specific set of concerns in which ei-
ther government sponsorship of overtly religious acts or direct aid to
religious groups was involved. The Court has frequently articulated
what it considers the three primary concerns behind the Establish-
ment Clause, "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity."' 161 This analysis frequently in-
voked a litany of concerns, illustrating the idea that separationism has
never been a catch-all prohibition on religious values in the public
square, but rather, focuses on a specific and relatively narrow set of
activities. As a practical matter, not only has the Court stated that
those concerns are the most significant to its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, but its decisions have been limited to those issues.
The only possible support for the position that separationism might
limit religious influence on political activity came in Lemon, where the
Court articulated a special type of entanglement problem known as
the "political divisiveness" test. In this respect, the Court emphasized
the potentially divisive political nature of programs involving annual
appropriations to religious groups, stating that "political division
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
156. Id.
157. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
158. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
159. In a number of decisions the Court has noted that the "wall of separation" is a qualified
one. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (stating that "total separation [is] not possible," the "wall
is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship").
160. See supra note 134.
161. See Watz, 397 U.S. at 668; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612: Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772; Meek, 421
U.S. at 359.
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First Amendment was intended to protect." 162 The Court voiced its
concern that "[t]o have [s]tates or communities divide on the issues
presented by state aid to parochial schools would tend to confuse and
obscure other issues of great urgency."' 63
At first glance, this language from Lemon might appear to call for
separating religious influence from political decisions. However, this
language is qualified in two significant respects. First, to the extent
the "political divisiveness" test still exists, the Court has indicated that
it cannot be the sole basis for finding an Establishment Clause viola-
tion. 164 Moreover, since the mid-1970s the test has been largely ig-
nored by the Court. On the few occasions that the "political
divisiveness" test has been mentioned, the Court was merely explain-
ing why it was inapplicable to the present case. 165
Second, and more importantly, the Court in Lemon indicated that
the "political divisiveness" test did not apply concern religious in-
volvement in politics generally, but applied only to the narrow issue of
annual appropriations of aid to sectarian schools. In Lemon, and
Walz v. Tax Commission166 decided the previous term, the Court af-
firmed the right of religious groups to be politically involved, stating:
"Of course, as the Court noted in Walz '[a]dherents of particular
faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on pub-
lic issues.' We could not expect otherwise, for religious values per-
vade the fabric of our national life."' 167 Thus, it was not the
162. 403 U.S. at 622.
163. Id. at 622-23.
164. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.
165. The "political divisiveness" test was a factor in invalidating several aid programs in the
mid-1970s, although always in concert with other concerns. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795-97;
Meek, 421 U.S. at 365, 372. The test was not mentioned in any 1990s decision until Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-24 (1997), where the Court summarily dismissed it as inapplicable. The
"political divisiveness" test was given only scant attention in the 1980s, usually to indicate it did
not apply. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 & n.17 (1987); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684: Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 403 & n.l (1983). In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), the Court did imply
that political divisiveness might occur from the scheme at issue, but the decision did not rest on
that basis and the case was subsequently overruled in Agostini. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, the
Court also made reference to the dangers of "political divisiveness" that might occur from a
scheme where the power to veto certain zoning decisions was delegated to churches, but again,
did not rest the decision on that basis. 459 U.S. at 127.
In addition to being generally ignored by the Court, the "political divisiveness" test has been
severely criticized by commentators. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST. LAW
1270-84 (2nd ed. 1988); Gaffney, supra note 104, at 205; Peter M. Schotten, The Establishment
Clause and Excessive Governmental -Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional Status of Aid to
Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools. 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207, 221-28 (1979): see
also, NOWAK, supra note 144, at 1262-63 (stating that the test is "futile at best").
166. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
167. 403 U.S. at 623 (quoting Waltz, 397 U.S. at 670).
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involvement of religious groups in politics that was problematic,
rather, as the Court indicated, it was the "successive and very likely
permanent annual appropriations that benefit relatively few religious
groups."' 16 Consequently, Lemon affirms the general right to bring
religious beliefs to the public square, carving out a narrow exception
for on-going political appropriations to parochial schools. 69 Even this
exception has, for all practical purposes, been ignored.
Therefore, the separationism often associated with the Lemon test
is limited to rather focused concerns, and does not suggest anything
inappropriate with religious values informing political decisions. The
Lemon test focuses on overtly religious acts and financial aid to secta-
rian institutions, and even under these circumstances has permitted a
number of church-state contacts. The test has not been used to sug-
gest a broader separation of religion and public life, and most cer-
tainly concedes the inevitability of numerous contacts between the
two. Lemon affirmed the pervasiveness of religious values in our na-
tional life, and the legitimacy of bringing such values into the political
arena.
170
Moreover, the separationism of Lemon has waned considerably in
recent years. First, the Lemon test, though not technically overruled,
has been weakened significantly in recent years, with the Court at
times ignoring it, and a majority of the Justices disavowing the test at
one time or another.' 7 ' Second, and more significant is the Court's
168. Id.
169. In several subsequent decisions the Court indicated that the "political divisiveness" test is
limited to direct appropriations to sectarian institutions. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 (stating that
the "political divisiveness" test only applies in cases involving "a direct subsidy" to religious
schools or institutions); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n.1t (same); TRIBE, supra note 165. 1229-30.
170. 403 U.S. at 623.
171. Cracks first began to appear in the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly, where the Court
characterized the Lemon criteria as "useful" to its inquiry, but emphasized an "unwillingness to
be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." 465 U.S. at 679. In subsequent
decisions a number of justices began to express dissatisfaction with the test, often in concurring
or dissenting opinions. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Alle-
ghenv County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 655-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part): Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 483 U.S. at 346-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-13 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Indeed,
in a 1993 concurrence in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398-99 (1993), Justice Scalia emphasized the fact that a majority of the Justices then sitting on the
Court had rejected the Lemon test in some opinion.
In the 1990s, the Lemon test was completely ignored in several important Establishment
Clause decisions. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994): Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993). It was given only brief attention in several others. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203; Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384. A large number of commentators have noted the decreasing influence
of Lemon, with some suggesting that the test has, in effect, been abandoned or rejected. See,
e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
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increasing reliance on neutrality as the touchstone of Establishment
Clause analysis. As noted above, neutrality as an analytical device has
been around since the beginning of modern Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence, and has often been intertwined with separationist lan-
guage and analysis over the years. 72 As Lemon and separationism
have waned, the Court has begun to explicitly apply a neutrality anal-
ysis to resolve Establishment Clause issues. Indeed, a growing num-
ber of scholars have suggested that neutrality has replaced
separationism as the Court's primary analytical framework for Estab-
lishment Clause cases.173
Under a neutrality approach to the Establishment Clause, the Court
does not focus on whether religion is advanced or inhibited by govern-
ment acts, but rather if religion is treated in a neutral fashion relative
to other groups. The Court has increasingly applied this approach in a
variety of settings to resolve Establishment Clause issues. For exam-
ple, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,174 the Court in-
validated the drawing of school district boundaries which created a
special district for Orthodox Jews, emphasizing throughout the opin-
ion that the state had failed to treat religion neutrally. 75 Even more
Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 323, 359-75, Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A
General Theory of the Religion Clause, 7 J. CONTEMp. L. ISSUES 357, 365 (1996): Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993). Others have noted its
decreasing use and current indeterminate status. See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 4, at 769 n.76.
172. The Court, as well as individual Justices, has frequently emphasized neutrality as a cen-
tral Establishment Clause principle. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 669-70; Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 687-68 (1971); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 792-93; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. Many scholars
have advanced various neutrality or equal protection models to govern Establishment Clause
issues. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Re-
ligion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Michael Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:
An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
311 (1986).
173. See Esbeck, supra note 135, at 20-39; Shivakumar, supra note 135, at 515; Lupu, supra
note 135, at 233-67; Garvey, supra note 135, at 78-83; see also, Teitel, supra note 4, at 766-80
(suggesting that the old model of neutrality, which was compatible with separation, is being
replaced by a new neutrality model which focuses on equal access to public life and therefore is
in tension with separation).
174. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
175. The Court began its analysis by stating:
A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause compels the
State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion, favoring neither one religion
over others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents. Chapter 748, the
statute creating the Kiryas Joel Village School District, departs from this constitutional
command by delegating the State's discretionary authority over public schools to a
group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context
that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised
neutrally.
Id. at 696 (citations omitted). The Court continued to emphasize the need for neutrality
throughout the opinion. See id. at 696-705.
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significant has been the Court's use of a neutrality standard in school
funding cases, where results have been increasingly influenced by neu-
trality concepts rather than separationism. For example, in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District,'76 the Court held that the provision
of a sign language interpreter to accompany a deaf student at a relig-
ious school did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court
stated that the Establishment Clause is not violated "[w]hen the gov-
ernment offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian school
as part of a general program."' 77
More importantly, in Agostini v. Felton,'78 the Court overruled its
prior decision in Aguilar v. Felton,i7 9 holding that providing publicly
paid teachers to parochial schools to assist disabled and disadvantaged
students with remedial and secular education was constitutional. t1 0
The Court noted that several premises underlying the Aguilar decision
had changed. For example, the assumption that the "placement of
public employees on parochial school grounds ... [creates an] imper-
missible... symbolic union between government and religion," 181 and
that "government aid that directly assists the educational function of
religious schools is invalid."' 8 2 The Court stated that several decisions
since Aguilar had rejected both positions, thus substantially changing
Establishment Clause analysis in those respects. 83 Although the
Court ostensibly applied the three prong Lemon test in its analysis, it
emphasized that the challenged aid was valid because "[i]t [did] not
result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by refer-
ence to religion; or create an excessive entanglement."' 184 Not only is
the second of these criteria essentially a neutrality standard, but the
Court emphasized neutrality concerns in finding that the other criteria
were met. 85
176. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
177. Id. at to.
178. 521 U.S. at 203.
179. Id. at 235.
180. Id. at 237.
181. Id. at 223.
182. 521 U.S. at 225.
183. The Court noted that Zobrest had rejected the premise articulated in Aguilar and Ball
that the presence of a public employee at a sectarian school inculcates religion in the student or
"constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion." Id., at 223. The Court also
noted that Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), dispelled the idea
that "all government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is inva-
lid." 521 U.S. at 225.
184. See id. at 234.
185. The Court stated as follows:
[W]e therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial
instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the Estab-
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These cases demonstrate the Court's recent movement toward neu-
trality, rather than separationism, as its primary model for Establish-
ment Clause analysis. As significant as that change is generally, the
Court has most clearly and consistently applied a neutrality standard
in addressing Establishment Clause concerns when private religious
speech seeks entrance into a public forum. In this type of case, which
is the most analogous to concerns about religion in politics, the Court
has only applied a neutrality standard in deciding Establishment
Clause concerns. In a series of five decisions stretching back almost
two decades, the Court has consistently held, often in difficult factual
circumstances, that religious speech is to be accorded the same level
of protection as other core speech, no more and no less. Decided
under the rubric of the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine, the
Court held in each of the cases that religious speech was to have
"equal access" to public fora. The model was that of neutrality, in
which religious speech was to be treated the same as other speech.
The Court also held that such neutral treatment of religion did not
create an Establishment Clause problem. To deny equal access would
violate the free speech rights of religious adherents.
In the first of these cases, Widmar v. Vincent,186 the Court held that
a public university could not prohibit a religious group from using
campus facilities when the use of such facilities was extended to non-
religious groups. The Court recognized religious activities as within
the protection of the Free Speech Clause, and emphasized that the
First Amendment prohibited discrimination on the basis of speech
content. 187 The Court specifically rejected the argument that the Es-
tablishment Clause prohibited the use of campus facilities by religious
groups, noting that permitting equal access to such groups did not
confer the state's imprimatur. 88 Thus, as long as the forum had a sec-
ular purpose, providing equal access to religious speech did not violate
the Establishment Clause; in fact, such equal access was mandated by
the Free Speech Clause.' 8 9
lishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by
government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as are pre-
sent here.
Id. at 234-35.
The Court further argued that there was no endorsement of religion, quoting language from
Witters and stating that "[t]he mere circumstance that [an aid recipient] has chosen to use neu-
trally available state aid" does not convey endorsement. Id. at 235.
186. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
187. Id. at 269.
188. Id. at 274-75.
189. The Court succinctly summarized its decision in the following statement:
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In Widmar, the Court took an important step toward neutrality in
holding that the provision of equal access to religious speech was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause. As noted by Douglas Laycock,
however, Widmar fit rather easily into an already well-developed body
of First Amendment jurisprudence concerning content discrimina-
tion. 9° It is well established that the government cannot discriminate
on the basis of speech content. 191 Thus, once a forum is open to the
general public admission cannot be denied based on the content of the
speech, including speech that is religious. Further, many of those de-
cisions involved religious speech and activity, an area that the Court
has long held qualifies for full protection under the Free Speech
Clause. 192 In Widmar, the Court noted and relied upon this longstand-
ing practice of providing free speech protection to religious speech.
193
Thus, although Widmar fits rather easily within the well-established
First Amendment doctrine of content-neutrality, it removed any
doubt that protecting religious speech does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause. In four subsequent decisions, Westside Board of Educa-
tion v. Mergen,194 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,195 Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pi-
nette,196 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,197 the Court similarly held that religious speech must be
treated neutrally and accorded equal access in the public square.
Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to en-
force a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the
fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and
the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
Id. at 277.
190. See Laycock, supra note 98, at 62-63.
191. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See generally, RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF Si'EEcu: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3.02 (1994).
192. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (preaching religious message by loud-
speaker); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (distribution of religious leaflets);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distribution of religious literature). Commentators
have noted that during this period the rights of religious adherents were protected almost exclu-
sively through the Free Speech Clause. See William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Di-
lemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545, 561-65 (1983); Leo Pfeffer, The
Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L. J. 1115, 1130 (1973).
193. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
194. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
195. 508 U.S. 386 (1993).
196. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
197. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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The first two of these cases, Mergens and Lamb's Chapel, involved a
rather straight forward application of equal access principles and Es-
tablishment Clause analysis. In Mergens, the Court upheld the "Equal
Access Act," a Congressional statute that in effect extended the pro-
tections of Widmar to high school campuses. 198 A majority of the Jus-
tices stressed that a neutral treatment of religious speech in the
context of a broader forum did not pose Establishment Clause
problems. 199 Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel the Court held that a church
could not be denied the use of a public school building for a film series
on child-rearing when the school was open to other groups. As in
Widmar, the Court emphasized that free speech rights required that
religious speech have the same access to the forum as other speech.
In Lamb's Chapel, the Court characterized the restriction as view-
point discrimination, because the school permitted other perspectives
on the same subject but excluded religious views. 200 The Court further
held that permitting the group to meet did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, because the requirements of Lemon had been met, there
was no danger of endorsement, and any benefits to religion were
incidental. 20
The two 1995 decisions, Pinnette and Rosenberger, provided the
more difficult fact patterns of traditionally sensitive areas of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. In Pinette, the Klu Klux Klan sought to
display a cross in a public square, traditionally open to displays of
other kinds, 20 2 but were denied access on the basis that the display of
198. 496 U.S. at 247-52 (plurality opinion, O'Connor, J.); id. at 260-62 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
199. No single opinion commanded a majority of the Court as to the Establishment Clause
analysis in Mergens. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion for four members of the Court found
no Establishment Clause violation under the Lemon test, applying an analysis similar to that
used in Widmar, see 496 U.S. at 248-52. In so doing, Justice O'Connor stressed that the basic
message of the Act was "one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let
religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostil-
ity toward religion." Id. at 248. Justices Scalia and Kennedy found no Establishment Clause
violation, although not agreeing with the focus on endorsement concerns advocated by
O'Connor, also emphasized neutrality in finding no violation. See id. at 260. Justices Brennan
and Marshall also concurred in the judgment, but were troubled by the possibility of endorse-
ment under the particular facts of the case. They emphasized that the Free Speech Clause re-
quired that student religious speech be treated in a content-neutral fashion, but were concerned
by the potential implied endorsement of religion, especially in light of the Court's traditional
sensitivity to Establishment concerns in public elementary and secondary schools. Thus, al-
though they found that the Act withstood Establishment Clause scrutiny, they noted a number
of steps the school should take to disassociate itself from the religious group. Id. at 262-70.
200. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-94.
201. Id. at 394-95.
202. 515 U.S. at 757-69.
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
a cross on public property would violate the Establishment Clause. 20 3
The Supreme Court, by a seven to two vote, found no Establishment
Clause violation, with no opinion commanding a majority. Justice
Scalia, joined by three other Justices, employed an analysis similar to
that used in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, treating the issue as one of
equal access to a public forum. He noted that religious speech was
fully protected under the Free Speech Clause, 20 4 and principles of con-
tent-neutrality required that it be treated the same as other speech.
205
Justice Scalia also stated that permitting the display did not violate the
Establishment Clause, noting that there was no government sponsor-
ship, any benefits to religion were incidental, and religion was treated
in a neutral manner.20 6
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter wrote concurring opin-
ions joined by each other and Justice Breyer, to form the majority.207
Although agreeing with aspects of Scalia's opinion, the concurring
opinions also applied an "endorsement test," which had been applied
in several previous cases 20 8 to determine if there were an Establish-
ment Clause violation. 209 Under this approach, even a neutral treat-
ment of religious speech might be invalid if, as originally formulated
by Justice O'Connor, a reasonable observer would conclude that gov-
ernment was endorsing religion.210 Both concurring opinions con-
cluded that under the facts of the case there was no endorsement.
Justice O'Connor noted that neutral treatment helps to dissipate en-
dorsement concerns, but also emphasized the placement of a dis-
claimer as a significant factor.211
In Rosenberger, the Court, in a narrow five to four decision, applied
the neutrality principle even where direct funding of religious activity
was involved.212 In Rosenberger, a Christian student group at the Uni-
versity of Virginia sought funding for a newspaper that was clearly
203. Id.
204. Id. at 760-61.
205. Id. at 762-63.
206. Id. at 763-64.
207. Id. at 772-83 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Souter, J., and Breyer, J.); 783-93 (opin-
ion of Souter, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Breyer, J.).
208. The endorsement test, long championed by Justice O'Connor, had been applied by a
majority of the Court in a few prior opinions, most notably Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
at 573.
209. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 772-83; (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 783-93 (opinion of Sou-
ter, J.).
210. See id. at 776-77 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
211. See id. at 782 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 789-93 (opinion of Souter, J.).
212. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-27.
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Christian in its message. 21 3 The University declined to provide the
funding, stating that such direct financial support violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.214 As noted in Justice O'Connor's concurring opin-
ion, the case involved the intersection of what she called two
fundamental principles, the neutral treatment of religion on the one
hand, and the prohibition on direct funding of religion on the other.215
The Court held that the Free Speech Clause required that the univer-
sity provide equal funding to the Christian group, and that doing so
did not violate the Establishment Clause.21 6 The Court viewed the
University's refusal to fund the religious newspaper as viewpoint dis-
crimination, 21 7 and once again emphasized a neutrality approach in
finding no Establishment Clause violation.218 The majority did, how-
ever, carefully limit its holding to the facts, noting that the manner in
which funding was received made perceptions of government endorse-
ment unlikely,219 a point further emphasized in a concurring opinion
by Justice O'Connor. 220
Therefore, in Rosenberger, the Court did not indicate that free
speech neutrality concerns will trump Establishment Clause concerns
in all instances. There may be circumstances where the resulting
linkage is so great as to override even a neutral scheme. Rosenberger
demonstrates, however, the powerful concerns of free speech neutral-
ity. As noted in the previous section, direct government funding of
overtly religious activity was very much at the heart of the Establish-
ment Clause ratification, and most certainly has been a central focus
of the Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 22' Thus,
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 847 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
216. See id. at 830-32.
217. See id.
218. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 838-44.
219. The majority emphasized the program's neutrality, pointing out that the Christian paper
was given funding on the same basis as any other student group. This distinguished it from the
types of church funding issues at the time the First Amendment was ratified. The majority also
noted that the money was paid directly to the printer, and that the University had disassociated
itself from the speech in question. Id. at 841-42.
220. Justice O'Connor was even more careful in limiting the holding, emphasizing three im-
portant limitations: first, the student group was clearly independent of the University; second,
the payments went to the third-party vendor and did not go directly to the group: and third, the
large number and wide variety of groups that received funding made it illogical to perceive that
the university endorsed any particular view. Id. at 849-52.
221. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385 ("Establishment Clause ...
absolutely prohibit[s] government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the be-
liefs of a particular religious faith"); Nyquist. 413 U.S. at 772 (Establishment Clause designed to
guard against "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in relig-
ious activity").
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extension of the neutrality principle to a situation involving direct
funding of clearly sectarian activities suggests how strong the neutral-
ity concern is when linked with free speech considerations.
The future status of a neutrality focus in general Establishment
Clause cases is yet to be seen, although there is reason to believe, as a
number of commentators have suggested, that a neutrality emphasis is
becoming dominant.222 Whatever the status of a neutrality approach
in general terms, it is clear that the Court has long and consistently
applied such an approach when religious speech seeks entry into a
public forum, even in the face of significant Establishment Clause con-
cerns, as in Rosenberger. This approach, dating back to the early pub-
lic forum cases, essentially affords religious speech equal status to
other speech in the realm of public debate.
The Court's emphasis on the equal status of religious speech is the
best way to assess whether resorting to religious values in politics
somehow violates separation of church and state. Viewed from this
perspective, which is well-established in First Amendment jurispru-
dence, granting religious speech equal status in political debate does
not pose an Establishment Clause problem. 223 The next subsection of
this article will briefly examine the free speech rationales supporting a
neutral treatment of religious content in the political arena.
B. Neutrality, Religious Speech, and Political Participation
The Supreme Court's consistent application of a neutrality standard
to protect religious speech in the public forum, even when Establish-
ment Clause concerns are raised, is deeply rooted in free speech doc-
trine. The fair and equal treatment of religious speech is an approach
that goes back more than six decades and was instrumental in the
emergence of modern free speech jurisprudence. Moreover, the val-
ues inherent in the equal protection of religious speech are among
those that strongly support full political participation.
The application of First Amendment protection to religious speech
began long before Widmar, finding its genesis in the public forum
cases of the 1930s and 1940s. These cases, often involving religious
speech, involved the extent to which citizens can engage in expression
or expressive activities in various public contexts. For purposes of this
article, two important principles emerged from these early public fo-
rum cases that have been consistently affirmed. First, the Court made
222. See Esbeck, supra note 135, at 20-39; Lupa, supra note 135, at 233-67; Shivakumar, supra
note 135, at 505-07; Garvey, supra note 35, at 78-83.
223. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 795-807 (asserting Free Speech Clause protects religious
political speech).
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clear that religious speech was to be afforded the same protection as
any other type of speech. A substantial number of the Court's deci-
sions involved religious speech and activity such as proselytizing, the
sale of religious literature, and preaching. 224 The Court did not treat
the religious character of the speech differently than any other speech,
a position that it has consistently held in subsequent years, as indi-
cated by Widmar and other more recent public forum cases.225
The second principle to emerge from these cases was that speech
restrictions must be content-neutral. Although the Court recognized
that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions could be placed
on speech,22 6 restrictions could not discriminate based on content. On
that basis, the Court struck down various licensing schemes that gave
unfettered discretion to public officials because of the possibility of
viewpoint discrimination. 227 In more recent years, the Court has ex-
tended the prohibition to any content-based regulation, stating that
"government has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. 2 28
The requirement of content-neutrality that emerged from these
cases has become the bedrock of First Amendment analysis. 229 It is
accurate to state that content neutrality has become the Court's pri-
mary analytical tool in addressing the validity of restrictions on
speech.230 Thus, although the Court has been reticent to find content-
neutral restrictions overly suppressive of speech,231 it has frequently
struck down restrictions that draw distinctions on the basis of con-
224. See supra note 192.
225. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263; Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
226. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 921 (1949); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160-61.
227. See Poulos, 345 U.S. at 395; Saia, 334 U.S. at 558; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296; Schneider,
308 U.S. at 147; Lovel, 303 U.S. at 444.
228. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
229. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-3 (1994); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd. 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988);
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980);
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95; SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 3.02[1][a]; Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination And The First Amendment, 139 PA. L. REV. 615, 616-17 (1991); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 189-97
(1983).
230. See, Williams, supra note 229 at 617 ("growing focus on content discrimination as the
central concern of the first amendment").
231. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984); see generally, Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 51
(1987); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine
of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 782-92
(1986).
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tent. 232 These holdings have included not only situations where spe-
cific forms of speech were singled out, but also where limited speech
was offered special protection.233 Nevertheless, the Court has made
clear, with only limited exceptions, that the government is to be neu-
tral in its treatment of speech content.
On numerous occasions, the Court has stated that the content-neu-
trality requirement generally applies to subject-matter as well as view-
point discrimination, 234 although it applies greater scrutiny to the
later. The Court has noted that even subject-matter restrictions tend
to distort free and open debate, and interfere with the self-realization
values of the First Amendment. 235 The Court has indicated, however,
that subject-matter restrictions might be tolerated in limited situa-
tions, such as where there is a captive audience, 236 or in a nonpublic
forum.237 However, these are limited exceptions to the general rule
prohibiting subject-matter discrimination, and would not be applica-
ble in the context of political deliberation and debate.
On the other hand, the Court has made clear that viewpoint restric-
tions go to the very heart of the First Amendment, and are almost
always invalid. 238 While reinforcing this position, the Court has used
the strongest language, noting that viewpoint discrimination is a par-
232. Although the Court's decisions in Widmar, Mergens, Lamb's Chapel, Pinette, and Rosen-
berger involved discrimination against religious speech, the Court has struck down content re-
strictions against other types of speech as well. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 462; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
233. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (holding that ban on residential picketing ex-
empted labor picketing); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92 (prohibiting picketing within certain distance of
school but exempting labor picketing).
234. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 461-62; Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
235. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
236. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding ordinance which
allowed commercial, but prohibiting political, advertising on public transportation).
237. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (government charitable donation cam-
paign); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 379 (1983) (internal school mail-
boxes); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base). The Court's current public forum
doctrine suggests that subject matter restrictions are permissible in nontraditional and
nondesignated public fora, where the only requirements are that restrictions be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. See Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678-79. This
exception to the general prohibition on subject-matter restrictions would only apply to state
owned property that does not qualify as a traditional public forum and has not been generally
open to public speech.
238. The Court has consistently prohibited viewpoint discrimination in a long line of cases.
See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804. Similarly, the Court's early public forum cases were predicated on
concerns about viewpoint discrimination. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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ticularly "egregious form of content discrimination, 2 39 and must be
very closely scrutinized. Thus, even though the Court will tolerate
some limited subject-matter restrictions in a nonpublic forum, such
restrictions must still be viewpoint-neutral. 24° As a practical matter,
this approach means that the normally strong presumptions against
any content-based restrictions are even more rigorously applied when
viewpoint restrictions are involved.24'
As might be expected, however, the distinction between subject-
matter and viewpoint discrimination is not always clear. Members of
the Court, and many commentators, have often disagreed on how to
characterize a particular restriction.242 As a general matter, subject
matter restrictions concern categories of speech, for example political
or religious speech. In contrast, viewpoint restrictions concern a par-
ticular view within that category. 243 However, which category a re-
striction fits into is often a matter of perspective, since the Court, and
many commentators often manipulate categories in one way or
another.
This same uncertainty exists, to some extent, over how limits on
religious values in politics should be viewed. On the one hand, ex-
cluding religious values from politics might be viewed as a subject-
matter restriction, since it would apply to all religious views and not
just one particular perspective. However, as indicated in both Lamb's
Chapel and Rosenberger, such a restriction is more appropriately char-
acterized as viewpoint-based. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court character-
ized a prohibition on a religious group's renting of a school to show a
film on parenting as a viewpoint restriction, since it prohibited the
religious perspective on that particular topic. 244 Similarly, in Rosen-
berger, the Court characterized the restriction as viewpoint, since the
university did not prohibit religion as a general topic, but only prohib-
239. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
240. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
241. As stated by Professor Rodney Smolla:
The doctrinal difference between content-based discrimination and viewpoint-based
discrimination is certainly significant. Content-based discrimination normally triggers
strict scrutiny (or some other form of heightened scrutiny), often resulting in the law
being held unconstitutional. But laws that engage in viewpoint discrimination have
even tougher going.
SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 3.26 (citations omitted).
242. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812-13 (refusing to decide whether the exclusion of some
form of a federal employee charity drive was necessarily viewpoint based); id. at 832 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (characterizing exclusion as viewpoint based).
243. See Williams, supra note 229 at 655.
244. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-95.
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ited "[j]ournalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. '245
Thus, it was the religious perspective on a variety of subjects that was
prohibited, which constituted a viewpoint restriction. 246
In the same way, any restriction on religious perspectives in politics
must be considered a viewpoint restriction, since the -religious view-
point is being excluded as it relates to a variety of political topics.
Although viewpoint restrictions are generally problematic, they are
particularly dangerous in the realm of political speech, where self-gov-
ernance concerns are strongest. Therefore, trying to eliminate the re-
ligious perspective wholesale, rather than having it compete with
other ideas in determining our political identity, constitutes a view-
point restriction lying at the heart of the First Amendment.247
The Court, therefore, has consistently held that content-neutrality
in general, and viewpoint neutrality in particular, are central to First
Amendment jurisprudence. In establishing this principle, the Court
has been particularly sensitive to the critical role played by free
speech in self-governance, what might be loosely called the First
Amendment's political vision. The Court has stressed the role of free
speech in insuring a free and democratic society. Central to fulfilling
this vision is the basic premise of content-neutrality, that the govern-
ment should not regulate or distort the terms of the debate. Content
245. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
246. See id. at 830-31. Although all nine Justices agreed that the restriction in Lamb's Chapel
constituted viewpoint discrimination, the four dissenting justices in Rosenberger characterized
the restriction as subject matter based, emphasizing that it applied equally to all religions and
even to agnostics and atheists. Therefore, it did not discriminate against any particular religious
viewpoint. Id. at 895-96. As was noted by the majority, however, debate is not bipolar. The
exclusion of multiple perspectives can just as easily constitute viewpoint discrimination as exclu-
sion of just one. Id. at 831-32. What was problematic, therefore, was not the exclusion of relig-
ion as a general topic, but exclusion of various religious perspectives from other subjects of
public debate that might occur through student publications. As noted by the Court, "[i]f the
topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is just as
offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both
a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet
another political, economic or social view." [d.; see also, Majorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimina-
tion, 24 HASTINGS CONs-r. L. Q. 99, 120-22 (1996) (agreeing with the Rosenberger majority that
the restriction was viewpoint based).
247. Others have also noted that eliminating the religious perspective on public issues consti-
tutes viewpoint discrimination. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 798-99. It should be emphasized
that even if the issue is characterized as a subject-matter restriction, the content-neutrality prin-
ciples still suggest that religion should have equal access in the political arena comparable to
other views. As noted above, the Court has generally applied content-neutrality requirements to
subject matter as well as viewpoint restrictions. Indeed, in Widmar v. Vincent, the Court appar-
ently treated the denial of access to a religious group as a subject matter restriction, yet still
found it violated the Free Speech Clause. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. The few exceptions
permitting subject matter restrictions all concern limited public fora, which certainly does not
describe the political process.
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discrimination threatens free and open debate, critical to our well-be-
ing as a society and to self-governance, by "rais[ing] the specter that
the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace." 248
The importance of free and open debate to our self-governance and
well-being was stressed in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,249
a leading content-neutrality case, where the Court noted:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to
assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaran-
teed that right to express any thought, free from government cen-
sorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.
Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would
completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the
principle that debate should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open!' 250
This concern relates to one of the oldest and most consistent theo-
ries offered over the years for the First Amendment: the marketplace
of ideas. Under this theory, the First Amendment serves to permit
free and open debate in the search for truth. 251 As stated in Mosley,
this includes the search for our cultural and political identity. This
theory of free speech has its roots in the writings of both John Milton
and John Stuart Mill,2 5 2 but became entrenched in American free
speech jurisprudence through the judicial opinions of Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Louis Brandeis. Holmes' famous dissent in Abrams v.
United States253 clearly sets forth the marketplace theory, stating as
follows:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. 25 4
248. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116; see also, R.A. V.v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting
Simon & Schuster).
249. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
250. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
251. Id.
252. See SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 2.15.
253. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
254. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting). Justice Brandeis articulated a similar theory of free
speech several years later in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
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As noted by First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla, the market-
place theory has come to inhabit "a compelling place in the American
imagination, and in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. '255
Although articulating it in various ways, the Court has frequently em-
phasized the idea that our system of free speech involves a system
where all ideas can be tested on their own merits.25 6 This has been
particularly relevant to efforts to discriminate on the basis of content,
where the Court has frequently suggested a marketplace rationale in
rejecting content discrimination. Thus, a primary reason for rejecting
efforts to discriminate on the basis of content is the marketplace meta-
phor: ideas should stand or fall on their own merit, and not by govern-
ment approval or disapproval. Although the marketplace metaphor
applies to a variety of speech types, the Court has been particularly
forceful in suggesting its relevance to politics and the democratic pro-
cess. As was suggested in Mosley, the building of our "politics and
culture" requires a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. '257
In recent years, the marketplace of ideas rationale for the First
Amendment has lost some favor with academics, and with several
scholars who question its worth as a legitimate First Amendment
value.258 However, other scholars continue to recognize the theory as
255. SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 2:15.
256. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116 (First Amendment removes government re-
straints on speech, "putting the decision of what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of
each of us"); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 438, 448 (1991) (stating that the danger of a tax
scheme on selective media is that "it will distort the market for ideas"); Bose Corp. v. Consum-
ers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) (free speech "essential to the common quest
for truth"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("there is no such thing as a
false idea .... However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction ... on the
competition of other ideas"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[i]t
is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market place of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail .... ); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (holding that the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open"); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (holding that the act of burning
the flag was protected by the First Amendment, the Court noted that "ft]he way to preserve the
flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently ... [but] to persuade them they are
wrong.").
257. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
258. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
964, 974-78 (1978). Criticisms of the marketplace theory are often premised on the idea that
truth will emerge from the open and free debate that the marketplace provides. However, many
scholars have questioned the validity of this assertion. As noted by Professor Smolla, the mar-
ketplace theory is better understood, not as an assurance of truth, but rather as a process. He
states "If]or Holmes[,] the benefit of the marketplace was not the end but the quest, not the
market's capacity to arrive at final and ultimate truth, but rather the integrity of the process. To
return to his famous phrase, the value of the market was its capacity to provide 'the best of
truth'." SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 2.18 (emphasis in original).
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at least one of several values underlying First Amendment protec-
tion. 259 Whatever its current standing in the academic community, the
Court continues to affirm the need for open debate as a central value
animating First Amendment jurisprudence generally, and content-
neutrality in particular. Beginning with Holmes' dissent in Abrams,
through the more recent decisions discussed in this article, the Court
has consistently affirmed the marketplace rationale as an important
foundation for its First Amendment jurisprudence. The primary im-
plication of the theory is straightforward, free speech should not be
restricted based on its content, and in particular, as it applies to our
democratic processes.
Two other theories that have received significant support over the
years are the self-governance and self-realization theories. The self-
governance theory overlaps, to a considerable extent, with the mar-
ketplace of ideas, but is distinct in how it relates free speech to the
political process. The theory is primarily associated with Alexander
Meiklejohn who, as an early First Amendment theorist, argued that
the freedom of speech is primarily grounded in the democratic process
and self-governance. According to Meiklejohn, free speech is the es-
sence of democracy and without it self-governance ceases to exist. 260
For this reason, speech takes on special significance in the political
process because it is the mechanism by which all members of society
can share the truth they have found and participate in political deci-
sions. As stated by Meiklejohn, "[i]ts purpose is to give to every vot-
ing member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the
understanding of those problems with which the citizen of a self-gov-
erning society must deal. '261 Such a view requires that speech, as it
relates to the political process, be completely free of content
discrimination:
[T]he vital point, as stated negatively, is that no suggestion of policy
shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather
than another. And this means that citizens ... may not be barred
because their views are thought to be false or dangerous. No plan
of action shall be outlawed because someone in control thinks it is
unwise, unfair, un-American .... And the reason for this equality
of status in the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundations of the
self-governing process. When men govern themselves, it is they-
259. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 191, at §§ 2.15-2.20; THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREE EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
260. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1965); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND IS RELATION 10 SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT (1948). For an excellent discussion of Meiklejohn's self-governance theory, see
SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 2.28.
261. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 260, at 75.
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and no one else-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and un-
fairness and danger. 262
Due to its focus on the primacy of speech for self-governance, the
self-governance theory affords only limited protection to other forms
of speech not related to the political process.2 63 For this reason, most
commentators reject it as a defining First Amendment theory,264 since
it limits rather than expands speech protection, and appears to be out
of line with the Court's own provision of protection to various forms
of speech outside the political arena. However, there is no doubt that
free speech is often viewed as particularly significant when applied to
politics and the democratic process. The Supreme Court has fre-
quently emphasized the critical role free speech plays in our political
system, characterizing it as a core value at the heart of the free speech
clause. 265 The self-governance theory might therefore be fairly recog-
nized as an important value supporting the right to free speech, al-
though not the only value capable of lending such support.266
The self-governance theory would also appear to support the equal
treatment of religious values in the political process, since it concerns
speech centrally related to our governance. As contemplated by
Meiklejohn, speech is granted near-absolute protection as it relates to
the political process, no matter what its source. In this context, there
is substantial convergence of the marketplace of ideas and self-gov-
ernance theories. The two theories characterize attempts to exclude
viewpoints from our political deliberations as a violation of the very
core of free speech guarantees.2 67 Such concerns about exclusion
would, of course, include religious values and perspectives, which are
262. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 260, at 26-27.
263. See SMOLLA supra note 191, at §2.28 (discussing the limits of self-governance theory
protection).
264. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra, note 165, at 786-88; Martin Redish, The Vahle of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 591, 604 (1982); Zechariah Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949).
265. See, e.g., FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (political speech
"at the core of the First Amendment"): Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("[t]he First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression ..."); Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 390 (political speech is the "essence of self-government"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966) ("a major purpose of [the First I Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs"); Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression: it is the essence of self-government").
266. See EME RSON, supra note 259 at 6-9 (identifying self-governance rationales as one of four
values supporting free speech).
267. See Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 641 (stating that "[a]t the heart of the First Amend-
ment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest
upon this ideal").
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examples of the many views that share an "equality of status" in de-
termining how we govern ourselves.
A third theory, and perhaps the leading one to gain substantial aca-
demic support in recent years, is the self-realization theory. This the-
ory centers the value of free speech not on the search for truth, but on
the value speech provides to the speaker's autonomy, dignity, and
self-fulfillment. Although this theory has been primarily advanced in
academia, 268 the Supreme Court has also alluded to similar values
over the years, though perhaps in less defined terms. Thus, the Court
has noted that "[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of
the polity but also those of the human spirit - a spirit that demands
self-expression. '269 The Court has also stated that "speaking one's
mind is a good in itself, ' 270 and emphasized that uncensored speech is
necessary "to assure self-fulfillment. ' 271 The Court has not viewed
these values as conflicting with the marketplace or self-governance
theories, but rather as a complement. Indeed, the Court has often
interwoven the various values as together supporting protection of
free speech.272
The self-realization value also supports reliance on religious convic-
tions in the political process on terms equal to any other set of values.
To the religious adherent, there is no set of values or beliefs more
fundamental to defining one's self than religion. Religion is not sim-
ply something one believes, but goes to defining one's self and is inte-
268. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984);
Baker, supra note 258; David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Morality
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). See also, SMOLLA, supra note 191,
at § 2.21 (stating that self-fulfillment theory has "arguably surpassed the marketplace theory as
the most commonly advanced justification for freedom of speech").
269. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974).
270. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. 503.
271. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
272. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), wherein the Court stated:
The constitutional right of free expression is .. . intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such free-
dom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in
the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity
and choice upon which our political system rests.
Id. at 26. See also, Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448-49 (quoting Cohen); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 ("to
permit the continued building up of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for
each individual, our people are guaranteed that right to express any thoughts free from govern-
ment censorship").
A number of commentators have also argued that the right to free speech is best understood
as supported by multiple values. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 259. at 6-9: TRIBE, supra note
165, at 788-89; SMOLLA, supra note 191, at § 2.39: Steven Shriffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and
Legal Scholarship, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1197-98 (1983).
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gral to one's being.273 More importantly, to many people, religion is
not limited to attending religious services, but rather is something that
necessarily permeates all of life. 27 4 Religion is the source of values,
and expressing one's self necessarily involves giving expression to
religion.
Any serious attempt at recognizing a self-realization value of the
First Amendment, therefore, requires that religious expression be
given equal protection in the political process. To require that the
devout somehow sever their religious values from their political par-
ticipation is asking that they cut off their basic identity from a core
First Amendment activity. Not only is this action likely impossible,
but it turns self-realization values on their head. If the First Amend-
ment is designed to enhance self-realization, then people need to be
able to define their expression in terms of who they are and the values
that make up the core of their being.275 For the religious adherent, this
realization necessarily means incorporating religious belief in political
expression.
In sum, current free speech jurisprudence strongly supports the le-
gitimacy of relying on religious values during the political decision
making process.276 This naturally flows from the Court's well-estab-
lished focus on content-neutrality, which requires that speech not be
favored or disfavored because of its content. 277 Moreover, any at-
tempt to preclude religious views from political decisions is best un-
derstood as viewpoint discrimination, which has long been considered
the most egregious type of free speech violation. Further, three pri-
mary values supporting free speech, the marketplace of ideas, self-
governance, and self-realization, strongly indicate that religious values
can legitimately serve as a basis for political decisions. Finally, not
273. For an excellent and well documented discussion of the holistic nature of religion, and its
relationship to political participation, see Gedicks, supra note 16, at 432-39.
274. See Gedicks, supra note 16, at 434 ("public secularization, then, is oppressive to the be-
liever. It requires that she divide and compartmentalize her life at the same time that her relig-
ious experiences testify that life is an indivisible and unified whole"); AuDI & WoLTERS1ORFF,
supra note 1, at 105 (holding that "for many religious people [i]t is their conviction that they
ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, and integration, in their lives; they ought to allow the
Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or whatever, to
shape their existence as a whole, including then, their social and political existence").
275. See Gedicks, supra note 16, at 434 (finding that "the exclusion of religiously based argu-
ments from politics excludes the most authentic part of a religious individual's personality from
political life").
276. For a discussion of how the self-realization and self-governance theories from the per-
spective of the listener support religious values in politics, see Smith, supra note 1, at 1624-33.
277. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 847 ("the epistemological attack on religion [in politics]
suggests a hierarchy of beliefs that is inconsistent with First Amendment Speech Clause jurispru-
dence, which posits that all ideas are equal").
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only do free speech principles legitimize reliance on religious values in
political decision making, but the Court has consistently stated that
the neutral treatment of religious speech, as required by the First
Amendment, will not be viewed as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.
III. THE VALIDITY OF RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED LAW
A final issue, logically following from the previous sections, is under
what circumstances, if any, does religiously motivated legislation vio-
late the Establishment Clause. The prior section focused on the valid-
ity of an individual's reliance on religious values in political decision
making, showing that such a reliance violates neither the letter nor the
spirit of the Establishment Clause. This section will look at whether
legislation that has in fact been influenced by such motivation is in any
way constitutionally infirm. As noted earlier, this issue can be viewed
as a distinction between "inputs and outputs. '2 78
Whereas few arguments have been made that religious inputs vio-
late the Establishment Clause, arguments are occasionally offered that
religiously influenced legislation violates the Establishment Clause.
For the most part, these arguments have been unsuccessful. Nonethe-
less, they indicate the difficulty of translating "inputs into outputs."
Thus, legal commentators have at times argued that laws restricting
abortion or opposing gay rights violate the Establishment Clause be-
cause of their religious influence.279 The Supreme Court itself has
been reluctant to make such a finding, except where traditional relig-
ious practices are involved, although Justice Stevens has articulated
such a position with regard to more conventional political issues. 28t °
Despite the longstanding and substantial engagement of religion in
politics, the Court has rarely addressed the issue of whether laws in-
fluenced by religious values violate the Establishment Clause. This
partly reflects the enormous difficulty of discerning the multiplicity of
rationales that typically support a law. This view also illustrates, how-
ever, that as a practical matter religiously motivated political "inputs,"
often dispositive "inputs," do not pose Establishment Clause
problems for resulting legislation. It is difficult to interpret the long-
278. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 795.
279. See infra note 319.
280. Justice Stevens has argued in several abortion decisions that restrictions on abortion vio-
late the Establishment Clause because they are based on theological grounds, in particular the
teachings of the Catholic Church. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772-788 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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standing acceptance of religious political activity and its results in any
other way. Nevertheless, the Court has provided some general princi-
ples in the relatively few instances in which the issue has been raised.
As a general matter, it appears that current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence requires that any government act or law serve some sec-
ular purpose. This requirement is the first prong of the Lemon tripar-
tite test, 281 although the requirement itself predates Lemon.282 Even
as Lemon has waned considerably in recent years, the secular purpose
requirement, by most accounts, appears to remain.2 83 Although the
application of this standard has been almost entirely in the context of
traditional Establishment Clause issues, such as aid to sectarian
schools, religious activity in public schools, and public displays of re-
ligion, it appears applicable to any law.
However, in recognizing the need for a secular purpose, the Court
has applied the requirement in a very deferential manner, particularly
outside the context of mandated religious activity in public schools.
Significantly, the Court has stated that a law does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause simply because it "coincides with a particular re-
ligious belief. '284 This holding was made clear in McGowan v.
Maryland,285 where the Court upheld a law that required businesses to
close on Sunday. The Court acknowledged that the original purpose
of the law might have been religious in nature,2 86 but held that the
state could legitimately now conclude that such a law furthers the
"general welfare of society. ''2 87 Importantly, the Court emphasized
that the mere fact that a law continues to coincide with religious be-
liefs does not make it invalid. 288
281. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
282. The requirement was first stated in Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), where the
Court developed the following test: "[Wjhat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact-
ment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." ld. at 222. The purpose com-
ponent was later applied to strike down an anti-evolution law in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107-09 (1968).
283. As noted in Part II of this article, the current status of the Lemon test is uncertain. In
recent years, the Court has given more emphasis to a neutrality analysis than Lemon's tripartite
test. The standard has not been rejected, however, and in the Court's most recent Establishment
Clause case, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court, though largely applying a neutral-
ity standard, specifically noted that the purpose inquiry remains. Id. at 222-23.
284. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 431.
287. Id. at 442.
288. Id.
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The Court has reiterated this idea in other cases, perhaps most no-
tably in Harris v. McRae,28 9 which involved a prohibition on use of
federal medicaid funds for abortions. In McRae, opponents of the leg-
islation argued that it violated the Establishment Clause because it
incorporated into law the views of the Roman Catholic church on
abortion. 290 The Court acknowledged that the law must have a secu-
lar purpose, but found no constitutional violation, emphasizing that
the amendment was supported by "traditionalist" values on abortion.
Therefore, the law did not violate the Establishment Clause. 291 The
Court again emphasized that merely coinciding with religious beliefs
did not make a law infirm.292
McGowan and McRae establish several basic points. First, the
Court will apparently require a secular purpose for any legislative en-
actment, even when outside the traditional Establishment Clause con-
texts involving aid to sectarian organizations and government
sponsored religious activities. Second, the mere fact that a law coin-
cides with religious values and beliefs does not make it infirm if there
is also a supporting secular purpose. Third, the Court will be very
deferential in assessing a secular purpose, accepting any rational basis
that might exist. Moreover, "traditional" values, which themselves
might have been largely shaped by religious influences, suffice for the
necessary secular purpose.
The tone of McGowan and McRae strongly suggests that legislation
will be valid as long as some secular purpose exists, although neither
case creates such a test. However, in more traditional Establishment
Clause settings, the Court has explicitly stated that the secular pur-
pose requirement is satisfied as long as some secular purpose exists.
Though not completely clear, the Court has for the most part taken a
very deferential attitude in reviewing the secular purpose require-
ment, usually accepting any plausible secular rationale and not inquir-
ing into the actual degree to which religious values might have
motivated the law.2 93 This is particularly true where the activity,
289. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
290. Id. at 319.
291. Id. at 319-20.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603 (1988); Witters, 475 U.S. at 485-86; Lynch,
273 U.S. at 680; Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Retained, Reformulated, or Rejected?, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 512, 515-16 (1990). Even scholars who have concerns
about religion in politics recognize the highly deferential review under the secular purpose re-
quirement. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 197 n. 9; Teitel, supra note 4, at 769 (stating that "[i]t is
easily satisfied by the assertion of any secular legislative purpose, no matter how transparent, as
long as the underlying religious purpose 'coincides' with the asserted secular purpose").
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though involving some religious motivation, does not facially involve a
coercive religious practice.
The Court's deferential approach to the secular purpose require-
ment is clearly demonstrated in a long line of cases where the Court
quickly, and with very little analysis, found the existence of a legisla-
tive purpose.2 94 The Court has indicated that legislation is invalid
under the secular purpose requirement only where its sole motivation
is to advance religion with no secular purpose. As the Court stated in
Lynch v. Donnelly,295 a statute fails the secular purpose requirement
only when "there [is] no question that the statute was motivated
wholly by religious considerations. '296 Thus, the secular purpose re-
quirement is typically met as long as there is some secular purpose,
even if religious motivation was a substantial or even dominant influ-
ence behind the action. On that basis, the Court has found, with very
little discussion, a secular purpose to exist in a long line of Establish-
ment Clause cases. 297
Despite this general deference in assessing whether a secular pur-
pose exists, the Court has, in a few instances, invalidated laws on a
finding of no secular purpose. In Stone v. Graham,298 the Court held
that the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools had no
secular purpose, and thus violated the Establishment Clause. 299 Simi-
larly, in Wallace v. Jaffree,30° the Court held that a required moment of
silence provision at the start of the school day was unconstitutional
due to the lack of a secular purpose.30 1 Both decisions rested upon a
complete lack of any secular purpose, with the Court in Wallace stat-
ing that a statute is invalid "if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion. '30 2 In Wallace, the Court found the legislative re-
294. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's typical case
as "almost effortlessly" finding some secular purpose).
295. 465 U.S. at 680; accord, Bowen, 487 U.S. at 603 (suggesting that a statute violates the
secular purpose requirement only if the religious purpose is the sole motivation); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (statute fails the secular purpose requirement "if it is entirely
motivated by a purpose to advance religion").
296. Id. at 680.
297. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222; Lamb's Chapel, 5(18 U.S. at 395; Bowen, 487 U.S. at
603); Witters, 474 U.S. at 485-86; School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. at 383; Mueller,
463 U.S. at 394-95; Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123-24; Meek, 421 U.S. at 363; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825, 829-30 (1973); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773; Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472,
479-80, n.7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon,
403 U.S. at 613.
298. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
299. Id. at 41.
300. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
301. Id. at 56-60.
302. Id. at 56.
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cord showed numerous statements indicating the only purpose of the
statute was to promote school prayer. 303 Moreover, the state failed to
present any evidence of a secular purpose. 30 4 In Stone, the Court re-
jected the state's rather weak attempt to establish a secular purpose
by relating the Ten Commandments to the development of Western
legal traditions, 305 noting that its "pre-eminent purpose" was "plainly
religious. 30 6
The other two cases where the Court invalidated laws for lack of a
secular purpose both involved perceived efforts to teach creationism
in public schools. In Epperson v. Arkansas,307 the Court struck down
a statute which prohibited the teaching of evolution in schools, stating
that it was clearly designed to further the teaching of religious dogma.
No purpose was offered other than teaching religious doctrine. 308 The
Court again used the secular purpose requirement in Edwards v.
Aguillar30 9 to invalidate a statute that required "balanced treatment"
of creation-science whenever evolution was taught. The Court stated
that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose of the Louisiana statute was clearly to
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created hu-
mankind. '310 This argument was in part reinforced by the statute's
legislative history, which the Court concluded reflected a clear intent
to advance a religious perspective. 31'
303. The Court noted that the statute's sponsor read into the legislative record a statement
that the bill was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools, a position he reiter-
ated before the district court." Id. at 56-57.
304. Id. at 57.
305. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. The state had attempted to create a secular purpose by requiring
that the following inscription be placed at the bottom of each display: "The secular application of
the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western
civilization and the Common Law of the United States." Id.
306. Id. at 41-42. In stating that the posting of the Ten Commandments was "plainly religious
in nature," the Court acknowledged that the second half of the Commandments concerned "ar-
guably secular matters, such as honoring one's parents, killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false
witness, and covetousness." It did note, however, that the first part of the Commandments con-
cerned more clearly religious duties: "worshiping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not
using the Lord's name in vain, and observing the Sabbath Day." Id. Thus, even in such a core
religious document as the Ten Commandments, the Court seemed to distinguish between inher-
ently religious activities and those explainable on secular grounds.
307. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
308. Id. at 107-09.
309. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
310. Id. at 590.
311. Id. at 591-92. After reviewing the legislative record, specifically statements made by the
Act's sponsor, the Court stated that "[tlhe legislative history documents that the Act's primary
purpose was to change the science curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive
advantage to a particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its en-
tirety." Id. at 592.
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These four cases indicate that the Court has on occasion scrutinized
the actual reasons behind a statute and been willing to invalidate legis-
lation for lack of a secular purpose. However, these cases do little to
undermine the highly deferential approach typically taken by the
Court. Three of the four cases, Epperson, Stone, and Wallace, were
predicated upon the absence of any secular purpose. In Wallace, the
Court went so far as to articulate the standard often stated in other
cases that a statute fails the secular purpose test only "if it is entirely
motivated by a purpose to advance religion. '' 312 Edwards, on the
other hand, might be interpreted as mandating invalidity if the pur-
pose is pre-eminently religious, while requiring some scrutiny into the
proffered secular purposes. However, Edwards was largely based on a
legislative history that clearly indicated that the statute was designed
to advance religious instruction in the schools. In three of the four
cases, the Court relied on a clear legislative history to establish the
absence of a secular purpose, whereas in Stone, only the weakest at-
tempt was made to provide a secular purpose.
These cases must also be qualified by the fact that they involved
coercive religious acts or instruction in the context of public elemen-
tary and secondary schools, traditionally a highly sensitive Establish-
ment Clause arena.313 That fact was emphasized in both Epperson314
and Edwards, with the Court in Edwards noting that it "has been par-
ticularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment
Clause in elementary and secondary schools. ' 315 Moreover, the cases
each involved what the Court saw as facially overt religious practices
and instruction, such as the posting of the Ten Commandments, man-
dated moments of silence to facilitate prayer, and instruction in crea-
tionism. To mandate such practices or instruction falls within the
Establishment Clause is quite distinct from permitting religious values
to inform political decisions.
Thus, it has only been in the context of mandated religious activity
in public schools that the Court has invalidated government acts
under the secular purpose requirement. In the overwhelming major-
ity of cases, the Court has readily found a secular purpose to exist,
even when it has otherwise held the government action unconstitu-
312. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56.
313. The Court has frequently emphasized that there are heightened Establishment Clause
concerns in the context of public elementary and secondary schools that require greater judicial
vigilance. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592; Aguillar, 482 U.S. at 583-84; Mergens, 496
U.S. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
314. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104.
315. Aguillar, 482 U.S. at 583-84.
[Vol. 50:111
2000]POLITICS, RELIGION, & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 173
tional under the Establishment Clause. 316 The Court has been defer-
ential to the stated purposes, and has consistently stated the standard
as requiring only that there be some secular grounds for the action,
declining to scrutinize whether or not the actions were predominantly
religious.317 The fact that a law coincides with religious values, and in
fact might to some degree be tied to those values, is inconsequential if
there is some supporting secular purpose.
Particularly significant in this respect have been the few cases where
the secular purpose rationale has been addressed in a more conven-
tional political context. As noted earlier, the Court rejected an Estab-
lishment Clause argument in McRae v. Harris, finding that a
prohibition on the use of federal funds for abortions was constitu-
tional. The Court's analysis assumed the need for a secular purpose,
but rather quickly found such a purpose in the "traditional" views on
abortion which coincided with religious views.318 The fact that the
amendment's sponsor, Henry Hyde, was a devout Catholic, or that the
Catholic Church had taken a strong and clearly influential position
against abortion did not make a difference. Moreover, the fact that
the traditional position was itself undoubtedly heavily influenced by
religious values apparently did not pose a problem.
There have been, of course, arguments made to more closely scruti-
nize the influence of religion on politics, and to find Establishment
Clause violations where religion is found to have a significant impact.
Although this has largely been confined to academic commentary, 319
it has on occasion also been suggested by Justice Stevens, who several
316. See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95; Larkin. 459 U.S. at 123-24; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 603.
317. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (government action fails secular purpose requirement only
when "motivated wholly by religious considerations"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (Court action fails
secular purpose "if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion").
318. 448 U.S. at 319-20.
319. Arguments that particular laws are infirm because of religious influence have largely
concerned abortion and gay-rights issues. See David R. Dow, The Establishment Argument for
Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 479 (1990) (abortion); Robert L. Maddox & Blaine
Bortnick, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Do Legislative Declarations that Life Begins
at Conception Violate the Establishment Clause?, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1989) (abortion); Syl-
via Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 944, 1025-26 & n.249 (1984)
(abortion); Andrew Koppleman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Discrimination, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 83, 130-31 (1997) (gay rights): Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and
Colorado's Amendment 2: The Gay Movement's Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights,
28 U. TOL. L. REV. 219, 242 (1996) (gay rights); Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and
Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argument that Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives Violate the Es-
tablishment Clause, 46 HASTINcS L. REV. 1585 (1995) (gay rights). At one time, professor Lau-
rence Tribe also suggested the Establishment Clause might prohibit restrictions on abortion, see
Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 21-25 (1973), but has since rejected that
position. See TRIBE, supra note 165, at 1350. Indeed, Professor Tribe's constitutional law trea-
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times has argued that restrictions on the right to an abortion violate
the Establishment Clause because they incorporate the teachings of
the Catholic Church. 320
These sentiments, though far from commanding a majority of the
Court, are nonetheless troubling in several respects. Not only do such
arguments require courts to discern and sort out legislative motive, a
difficult task under the best of circumstances, 32' but they work to un-
dermine the free speech guarantees that protect religiously informed
"inputs" into the political process. In order to take seriously the right
of citizens to rely on religious convictions in the political process, a
right firmly grounded in the First Amendment and long reflected in
the political practices of our nation, courts must accept the validity of
most laws that might result from such inputs. To protect "inputs," but
disallow them if they are effective in changing law, is problematic.
This reflects the tension that exists, at least in this context, between
"inputs and outputs." "Inputs," which are clearly protected under the
First Amendment speech guarantees, at some point potentially be-
come "outputs" in the form of law, which are subject to some review
under the Establishment Clause. Although current law requires some
secular purpose, which is arguably in tension with the idea of pro-
tected "inputs," the highly deferential manner in which the test is ap-
plied is quite protective of religious political expression. Aside from
the sensitive area of coercive and overtly religious practices in public
schools, where the Court has appropriately shown a modest degree of
scrutiny, the Court has consistently refused to invalidate laws because
of religious influence or purpose. Rather, the Court has invalidated
government acts based on their actual impact, which has been limited
to situations involving direct financial aid to religion, coercive and
overtly religious practices, and clear religious symbolism.
Current law, therefore, requires some ostensible secular purpose for
any legislation, however, the Court has applied the test in a highly
deferential manner outside the context of public schools. As a practi-
cal matter, the current standard poses little impediment to religious
values in the political process, since a variety of values and rationales
tise argues at some length that political action should not be held invalid because of religious
motivations or influences. See TRIBE, at 1279-84.
320. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Webster,
492 U.S. at 566-72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
321. See TRIBE, supra note 165, at 1280 (noting the difficulty of discerning religious motives of
legislators, especially since "many legislative motives will be partly religious, and that few if any
will be wholly so."); see also, Eisgruber, supra note 122, at 379-80 (discussing the difficulty of
reviewing legislation for a proper secular purpose).
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are inevitably intertwined in any legislation. 322 Even if religious views
are preeminent, the Court would uphold legislation if a plausible secu-
lar rationale for the statute exists. 323
Although the current standard is protective, it may be viewed as
discounting religious speech by requiring some accompanying secular
rationale. An alternative approach suggested by several commenta-
tors would focus on the legislative impact, rather than the motivation
behind the legislation. 324 This approach would invalidate laws which
mandate or coerce overtly religious acts, such as worship, Bible read-
ing, or prayer. However, such a test would not invalidate legislation
simply because it was informed by religious values. The focus would
not be on the motivational source, but rather on the activity itself,
with restrictions being limited to inherently religious activity.325
In theory, eliminating the secular purpose inquiry and focusing only
on the impact of a law would be a significant change. In reality, how-
ever, such an approach would reflect little change from current prac-
tice.326 As noted above, the Court's highly deferential approach to
the secular purpose requirement has, in most contexts, resulted in an
essentially similar approach. The one exception would be the Court's
322. See TRIBE, supra note 165, at 1280 (noting that legislation is often partly supported by
religious motives, and rarely, if ever, wholly supported by such motives).
323. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
324. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1634-39; Laycock, supra note 2, at 811-12; see also, Esbeck,
supra note 135 at 37-38 & n.147 (suggesting a distinction between "inherently religious" activity,
such as "worship, religious teaching, prayer, proselytizing, or devotional Bible reading," which
the government cannot support under the Establishment Clause, and mere overlap between
"statutory purpose and religious belief," which is permitted); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 673, 686 (1980)
(religious purpose alone should not constitute an Establishment Clause violation, rather govern-
ment action taken for a religious purpose that is "likely to result in coercing, compromising or
influencing religious beliefs"). For a rejection of this position, see PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS,
supra note 1 at 35-36; Greene, supra note 1. at 1629-30.
325. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42 (drawing a distinction between those portions of the Ten
Commandments which concerned "arguably secular matters," such as the prohibitions on mur-
der, adultery, false witness, theft, and covetousness, and those which were inherently religious,
such as the commands to worship, avoid idolatry, not use the Lord's name in vain, and keeping
the Sabbath).
326. In fact, professor Richard Myers has suggested that this is precisely what the Court does.
After reviewing the secular purposes cases, Myers states as follows:
The cases in which the Court has relied on the absence of a secular purpose differ from
[religious political activity] because of the Court's perception of the subject matter of
the legislation. If it views the legislation as inherently religious, such as requiring the
teachings of creationism, posting of the Ten Commandments, or prayer in the public
schools, then the Court will occasionally invoke the secular purpose prong of the
Lemon test. The Court's principal concern in these contexts is not religious motiva-
tions, as such, but the character of the legislation.
Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CArH. U. L. REV. 19,
58 (1991).
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concern about religious motivation in the highly sensitive area of ele-
mentary and secondary public schools. To limit inquiries into purpose
and motivation to the public school context, and defer in more con-
ventional political contexts recognizes the fact that religious values are
simply one ground upon which to decide public issues.327
There are, several distinct advantages to continuing a highly defer-
ential approach in evaluating the secular purpose requirement, or
even abandoning it altogether in more conventional political settings.
First, a deferential approach avoids the potential disenfranchisement
of religious adherents that might occur if a less deferential approach
were taken. Political choice inevitably involves ethical/moral reflec-
tion. For the devout, the basis for such reflection is religion. For
many people, it is impossible to sever the religious component from
one's identity and values.328 To scrutinize laws for religious influences
would in effect disenfranchise a significant portion of the population
from the political process. 329
Second, a deferential approach to legislative religious purpose is
more consistent with treating religious views in a neutral and equal
manner to other political perspectives. As noted previously, the
327. Similarly, it may be argued that religiously motivated actions have a secular dimension
when they address "worldly" matters. Professor Steven Smith makes this point quite forcefully
in discussing two different concepts of "secular," which he labels the "exclusionary" and the
"inclusive." The "exclusionary" concept defines secular by what it excludes, that is, anything
religious. Thus, the secular is only what cannot be considered religious, a problematic concep-
tion when religious values permeate almost all dimensions of life. The "inclusive" defines secu-
lar by what it encompasses, with "secular beliefs, values, practices, or facts [being] those that
pertain to the affairs of this world or life." Professor Smith concludes as follows:
There is a vast set of beliefs, values, and practices that occur within and are plainly
relevant to terrestrial concerns but are nonetheless "religious" in the sense they are
central to institutions and belief systems generally regarded as religious. Religions
have commonly shown intense concern for the temporal matters, including concern for
the poor, earthly justice and virtue, and political liberation. Without denying the relig-
ious character of such beliefs, values, and practices, a positive or inclusive understand-
ing of the term secular would also treat them as secular, because they are pertinent to
worldly concerns.
Smith, supra note 17, at 1000-01. This approach would also limit Establishment Clause concerns
to inherently religious activities, recognizing that when religious values are brought to more
conventional political settings they are serving a secular as well as a religious function.
328. See Gedicks, supra note 16, at 432-39; AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 1, at 105.
329. See Michael Scaperlanda, Who is my Neighbor? An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Re-
form, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (1997) (prohibiting religion in politics
would disenfranchise religious believers); Idelman, supra note 1, at 358-59 (removing religion
from politics and public square would disenfranchise religious citizens and result in their aliena-
tion); Smith, supra note 17, at 999 ("[b]ecause citizens who hold deeply religious world views
that pervade their value systems and underlie their political perspectives would be incapable of
complying with the secularism requirement, courts might effectively exclude them from partici-
pating in the political process altogether").
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Court has long stated that religious views should be treated equally to
others, neither favored nor disfavored. This concept of neutrality,
which is at the heart of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, especially
with respect to concerns of free speech, is undermined if religious mo-
tivation is a disqualifying factor in legislation. Such an approach
would constitute indirect viewpoint discrimination by subjecting the
religious perspective on a host of political issues to a disability not
placed on any other perspective. 330
Third, to scrutinize legislation for religious motivation would con-
flict with the values animating the right to free speech, such as the
marketplace of ideas and self-realization. This idea is particularly true
with regard to the role free speech plays in self-governance. The
Court has frequently affirmed such a concept by requiring that citi-
zens be free to express their views without restraint in the political
arena. 331 This value is substantially compromised, however, if result-
ing legislation is potentially infirm because of religious influences. 332
Fourth, as a practical matter, a deferential approach to reviewing
religious motivation is consistent with the longstanding involvement
of religion in America's political life. It is hard to take seriously any
assertion that religion cannot be the basis for law considering the fre-
quent and at times high profile role that religion has had in our politi-
cal and social life.333 Although religious views have often played a
"pre-eminent" role, to borrow language from Edwards, there is no
suggestion that the resulting legal change was invalid on that basis.
For these reasons, courts should continue to apply a highly deferen-
tial approach to assessing secular purpose, and consider eliminating
the inquiry altogether in more conventional political contexts. This
does not mean that laws premised upon, or influenced by, religious
convictions are immune from other constitutional restraints. Rather,
this approach suggests that the mere fact a law was influenced by, or
reflects religious values, should not in and of itself be a disqualifying
330. See Scaperlanda, supra note 329, at 1615: TRIBE, supra note 165, at 1280 ("actions that
discourage religious involvement in politics raise free exercise concerns, by imposing a disability
on the basis of religious conduct and, perhaps, belief"); see also Laycock, supra note 2, at 812
(evaluating legislative outputs for religious purposes restricts religious political "inputs" and
thereby does "indirectly what cannot be done directly").
331. See notes 238-67 supra, and accompanying text.
332. See TRIBE, supra note 165, at 1279-80 (attempting to reduce the impact of religious be-
liefs on political participation would "undercut" our "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
333. See e.g., supra note 9; NOLL, ONE NATION, supra note 5, see also, Laycock, supra note 2,
at 803 ("[many] of the books and articles that would bar religious arguments from political de-
bate do not even acknowledge this history [of extensive religious involvement in politics], yet it
is absolutely central to their claim that they somehow explain this history away").
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feature. Certainly, to the extent a law mandates religious practices or
observances, or impermissibly aids religion, it may violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. For example, school prayer, Bible reading, man-
dated instruction in religious dogma, government sponsorship of
religious displays, financial support of churches, and other similar ac-
tivities can be seen as violating the Constitution, not because of their
religious motivation, but rather because they force involuntary relig-
ious observances. The coercive religious act itself, rather than the mo-
tivation behind it, creates an Establishment Clause problem.
Moreover, religiously based laws might violate other constitutional
provisions. Most obvious would be a religiously influenced law at-
tempting to prohibit abortions. Although the religious motivation
should be irrelevant to the validity of the law, it would be invalid be-
cause it violated the recognized constitutional right to an abortion.334
Similarly, religious resistance to gay rights might be subject to privacy
interests or recognition of gays as a quasi-suspect class under equal
protection review. 335 These inquiries illustrate the fact that religiously
influenced laws are subject to the same ground rules as other laws.336
Finally, the most fundamental and significant control on religious
activity was anticipated by Madison in Federalist Number 10.
Madison notes that religious factions, similar to other factions that
might exist, are subject to the controls inherent in our republican form
of government. This position subjects political ideas, religious or oth-
erwise, to a deliberative decision-making process in which advocates
of any position must convince others to join their position in order to
334. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
335. A number of commentators have argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation
should be subject to some form of heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Bobbi Berstein, Note, Power,
Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating "Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47
STAN. L. REV. 269 (1995); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gays
is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
336. The use of the abortion and gay rights examples in this paragraph are not meant to
suggest that political activity informed by religious belief would necessarily be opposed to abor-
tion and gay rights. Certainly, a significant number of conservative Christians have been politi-
cally involved in such a manner. Nevertheless, a significant number of religious people support
such rights. Indeed, as a practical matter religious political perspectives on most issues will run
the full spectrum, defying labels such as liberal or conservative. See SKILLEN, supra note 3 (dis-
cussing diversity of political positions of those within Christian tradition); FOWLER, supra note 9,
at 77-110 (discussing variety of religious political traditions); Shriver, supra note 11, at 86-87
(discussing extensive and primarily liberal political agendas of mainline denominations in the
1990s). The abortion and gay rights issues were chosen because they are two issues on which
people have often focused while advocating removal of religious beliefs from politics. See supra
note 299. It should be emphasized, however, that proposals to remove religion from politics are
not limited to those issues, and as typically expressed, would make resort to religious values
inappropriate to a number of political issues.
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effect change. This process involves both compromise and an assess-
ment of the merits of any proposal, with the result being moderation
of extreme positions and pursuit of common ground. In this sense, the
marketplace of ideas itself acts as a control against any type of ex-
tremism. 337 As noted by Justice Brennan's concurrence in McDaniel
v. Paty, "[t]he antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots
who would inject sectarianism into the political process is to subject
their ideas to refutation in the marketplace of ideas and their plat-
forms to rejection at the polls. '338
This view, where religious values must stand or fall on an equal ba-
sis with all other political perspectives, is most consistent with First
Amendment values, our political philosophy, and traditions as a peo-
ple. Such an approach does not disqualify or burden any one position
based on its views, but equally subjects all to the marketplace of ideas.
Religious values should have full entry into the political arena, and
legislation resulting from or influenced by such values should not be
viewed as infirm under the Establishment Clause on the basis of the
religious motivation alone.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a recent issue of Free Inquiry magazine, Alan Dershowitz la-
ments what he considers America's often unreceptive attitude toward
unbelievers, including their role in the political arena. In arguing that
"[t]he world must be made safe and secure for disbelievers," Dersho-
witz states:
Atheists and agnostics ... are every bit as qualified to hold public
office as are people who believe in an intervening God. Disbeliev-
ers should not accept second-class status in a nation whose tradi-
tions and laws forbid tests of faith as a condition of citizenship or
office holding.339
337. See FEDERALiSI No. 10, supra note 117, at 82-84. Madison noted that by delegating
decisions "to a small body of citizens elected by the rest" it "... refine[d] and enlarge[d] the
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens." Id. Moreover,
to the extent that elected officials might themselves, in some cases, be particularly factious and
"destroy the trust of the people," this would be offset by the larger territory a republican govern-
ment could govern, taking "in a greater variety of parties and interests ...[making] it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens ..... Id.
338. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
339. Alan M. Dershowitz, Taking Disbelief Out of the Closet, FREE INQUIRY 6, 7 (1999). Der-
showitz's short op-ed piece concerns what he perceives to be the reluctance of Americans in
public life to identify themselves as "atheists, agnostics, skeptics, or humanists." He views this as
a particular problem in politics, with an increasing pressure for American politicians to "publicly
advertise their religious beliefs." Although others have written about a perceived pressure in the
opposite direction, most notably Stephen Carter in The Culture of Disbelief, supra note 4, 1 do
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I concur. The thesis of this article is relatively simple and closely al-
igned with Dershowitz's own concerns. Briefly stated, the thesis of
this article is that our constitutional structure established a secular
state that is neutral towards religion. In this sense, religious values
should be viewed on the same level as any other value in terms of
their political voice. Thus, religious norms should have entry into
politics on the same basis as any other ethical/moral belief system, and
for that reason can be the basis for law.
Such a vision is supported both by the historical context of our
founding, the Constitution, and First Amendment jurisprudence. Al-
though it is unlikely that religion was the dominant ideology behind
our founding and resulting constitutional order, it was nonetheless an
important contributing factor. More importantly, religion was closely
intertwined with politics at our founding on various levels. Religion
provided ideological support, lent its vocabulary to other ideologies,
and provided a major motivation for revolution. Moreover, despite
the difficulty of discerning the clear original intent of the First
Amendment's religion clauses, the historical context of the clauses
and the rationales for their adoption indicate that they were not in-
tended to banish religion from political life.
First Amendment jurisprudence and its supporting values also
strongly support a neutral treatment of religious norms in the political
process. Not only has the Supreme Court consistently applied a neu-
trality analysis to the Establishment Clause when religious speech is
involved, but any attempt to preclude religious speech from politics is
best understood as viewpoint discrimination, lying at the very heart of
the Free Speech Clause. Moreover, the values underlying protection
of free speech strongly require that religious values have access to the
political process. Both the marketplace of ideas and self-governance
theories state that ideas or values should not be excluded from the
marketplace. Rather, all ideas and values should compete with all
other ideas on their own merits. This is particularly true with regard
to the political process, where the Court and commentators have con-
sistently noted the need for open and free debate. Self-realization val-
ues similarly support the involvement of religion in politics. To
require the devout to sever their religious values from political partici-
not necessarily dispute Dershowitz's perception or his underlying concern. I share some of the
same misgivings. The concern addressed in this article, however, is the substantial amount of
academic commentary in recent years that has suggested that religious values are inappropriate
in politics, and in particular that faith-informed politics run counter to the First Amendment.
Those arguments would restrict not just politicians, but any religious person as they participate
in politics.
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pation would require them to cut off their basic identity from a core
First Amendment activity.
For these reasons, recent arguments that the Constitution in gen-
eral, and the Establishment Clause in particular, require that religious
values be removed from the political process are misplaced. Neither
the letter nor the spirit of the First Amendment requires such a result.
In fact, quite the opposite is true. Religious values can inform politi-
cal reflection and direct political involvement the same as any other
value system. Allowing religious values to influence politics includes
not only an individual's right to rely on religious beliefs and values in
helping form political opinions, but also recognizes the legitimacy of
laws influenced by such beliefs.
This, of course, is the story of our nation. From our founding to the
present day, religion has been a frequent and central participant in
our political life. Religion's effect on political life has included highly
visible movements, ranging from the noble to the embarrassing. Far
more significant, however, is religion's role as a source of ethical and
moral norms for the devout, who use religious expression in the politi-
cal choices they make. At this level, religion and politics most com-
monly, and understandably, intersect. To suggest that such people set
aside their religious convictions when entering the political arena is
not only impossible to achieve, but is counter to our traditions as a
nation and the values at the heart of the Constitution.
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:111
